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Colombian state and non-state actors are engaging in an important conceptual 
debate concerning the nature of a "new" type of armed group in the country. The state 
labels these groups "BACRIM" (criminal gangs), arguing that they are actors of 
organized crime. Members of civil society reject the state's conceptualization, arguing 
that these groups are paramilitaries operating in the context of the armed conflict. These 
organizations explain that "new" groups commit the same systematic human rights 
violations and adhere to the same modus operandi as the Autodefensas Unidas de 
Colombia, an umbrella organization of over 30,000 paramilitaries that the government 
supposedly demobilized in a 2005 negotiation. The state, in turn, argues that 
paramilitarism no longer exists in Colombia and that these "new" groups do not adhere to 
the counterinsurgent political ideology that was characteristic of paramilitarism. My 
research project is a nuanced analysis of the Colombian state and non-state debate 
concerning these "new" armed groups. I combine interviews with state and civil society 
representatives with historical contextualization in order to understand what is at stake in 
the positions that both sides are aggressively fostering in the debate. In conceptualizing 
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these "new" groups, many key informants engaged in a renegotiation of the state-formed 
historical memory concerning paramilitarism.  An analysis of the trajectory of 
paramilitary activity reveals the protection of important elite economic and political 
interests as the driving force of paramilitarism; this paramilitary project fits within the 
goals of a state-sponsored economic process of capital accumulation. In utilizing the 
paramilitary label, civil society highlights these as the structural causes of paramilitarism. 
The state, in turn, attempts to cement its simplified definition of paramilitarism as a 
counterinsurgency project in removing the term 'paramilitary' from the official discourse. 
Furthermore, in erasing paramilitarism from the discourse, the state attempts to 
disassociate itself from a dark history of human rights violations against civilians. To 
fully understand the debate in Colombia is to understand more generally the power and 
weight of words in denouncing or, conversely, in silencing important issues of human 
rights and, ultimately, in accurately or inaccurately constructing historical memory of 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
At a March 2011 Inter-American Commission hearing, I witnessed as human 
rights organizations and the Colombian state argued fervently over the nature of a “new” 
type of armed group in the country.1 I attended the hearing as an assignment while 
interning with the Latin America Working Group, a human rights advocacy organization 
in Washington, D.C. On one side of the room congregated a handful of individuals 
representing different agencies of the Colombian government. Directly facing them sat 
various representatives of the most vocal and visible human rights organizations in 
Colombia. In the course of an hour, I watched as these state and non-state actors 
passionately disputed whether these "new" armed groups should be considered criminals 
and delinquents or whether they are paramilitary groups actively participating in the 
country's armed conflict.  
The state representatives in attendance opened the hearing by collectively arguing 
that paramilitarism no longer existed in Colombia. Human rights organizations 
immediately rejected this claim, maintaining that paramilitarism does, in fact, continue to 
exist in the country under the inaccurate and misleading name of bandas criminales 
(BACRIM) or criminal gangs. The organizations elaborated by emphasizing that these 
groups commit the same systematic human rights violations and adhere to the same 
modus operandi as the AUC (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia), an umbrella 
organization of over 30,000 paramilitaries that the government supposedly demobilized 
in a 2005 negotiation process (Grajales 166). The state quickly responded by explaining 
that criminal gangs were a completely different phenomenon, one that they characterized 
as organized crime. They argued that these armed groups primarily engage in drug 
                                                
1 In order to fully capture the contentious debate on the way in which these groups are labeled, I will use 
the term "new" armed groups, rather than adopting the state or civil society label. 
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trafficking and they do not have the distinct organizational structure and the anti-guerrilla 
political ideology that was characteristic of paramilitarism. It was only the time limitation 
of one hour that abruptly ended the aggressive back-and-forth between representatives of 
the state and civil society. 
In the weeks following the Inter-American Commission hearing, I attended a 
meeting of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Still reflecting on the 
intense debate I had witnessed, I was extremely surprised to hear a United States 
congressman praise Colombia as a model of security and respect for human rights in the 
Western Hemisphere. The congressman went on to declare the paramilitary 
demobilization process a complete success and commended the Colombian government's 
efforts at fighting the "war on drugs" and combatting organized crime. In the U.S. 
representative's discourse, there was not a single trace of the intense debate that was 
taking place between state and non-state actors in Colombia. I waited to hear a voice of 
dissent or protest against the congressman's speech, one that reflected the complexity of 
the debate I had witnessed; I only heard voices of assent and a deafening silence 
concerning the other side of the story. The U.S. Senate unquestioningly reproduced the 
Colombian state's discourse. This hearing, unlike the intense one I had attended just 
weeks prior, ended harmoniously. 
 In browsing through some of the most prominent newspapers in Colombia, I 
noticed that the media, too, reproduced the state discourse, utilizing the state-developed 
term of "BACRIM" to describe the "new" armed groups in the country. For the most part, 
none highlighted the argument for the possible continuity of the paramilitary 
phenomenon. A select few news sources suggested this side of the debate in passing, 
sometimes referring to "post-demobilization armed groups" or paramilitary "heirs," rather 
than criminal gangs. However, the mainstream media did not directly problematize the 
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complex conceptual divide between the state and civil society and the reasons for and 
implications behind the positions that different actors were aggressively fostering in this 
debate. 
My research project is a nuanced analysis of the Colombian state and non-state 
debate on these "new" armed groups. It combines interviews with state and civil society 
representatives with a historical contextualization of the range of positions represented in 
the debate. Such contextualization entails not only an analysis of the way that "new" 
armed groups are represented, but also a conceptual analysis of the trajectory and history 
of the paramilitary phenomenon. Labeling without proper historical background proves 
insufficient in fully understanding the true nature of these "new" armed groups. I will 
contextualize the different positions expressed in the interviews in order to answer 
several questions. What are the reasons behind the disparate ways in which these "new" 
armed groups are labeled? What are the intermediate positions between the two extreme 
labels of BACRIM and paramilitarism? What do these intermediate positions imply about 
the complexity of these "new" armed groups and their relationship to paramilitarism? In 
tracing paramilitarism historically, do the motivations of the now-demobilized 
paramilitaries show a complete separation from actors of organized crime? Does the most 
widely accepted label of criminal gangs (BACRIM), promulgated by the state and 
reproduced by the media and international community, accurately capture the true nature 
of these armed groups? After examining the reasons behind the different positions 
concerning these groups and using historical contextualization to gauge the validity of the 
state and non-state conceptualizations, I will make clear the importance of problematizing 
the dominant label of criminal gangs or BACRIM. To this end, I will show how the ways 
in which these groups are labeled define the legal course of action taken against them. A 
contextual analysis of the modus operandi of these groups is essential in determining 
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whether these "new" armed groups commit human rights violations or whether the illicit 
acts they commit can simply be considered acts of common crime. If these groups are, 
indeed, generating human rights issues, I will show how labeling is essential in 
determining whether these violations are either highlighted and legally prosecuted or 
completely ignored. To fully understand the debate in Colombia is to understand more 
generally the power and weight of words in denouncing or, conversely, in silencing 
important issues of human rights and, ultimately, in accurately or inaccurately 
constructing historical memory of armed conflict. 
While my project will show the importance of naming in the legal prosecution of 
human rights violations in the Colombian context, it will also underscore the limits of 
such labeling and the necessity of contextualization in accurately understanding the 
nature of paramilitarism and of "new" armed groups. Such contextualization means 
understanding the long-standing structural issues that fuel the violence engendered by 
these armed actors. An analysis of the debate through in-depth interviews shows that the 
dichotomy between criminal gangs and paramilitarism, based on a complete separation 
between common crime and political crime, is a false one. Using the interviews as a 
starting point, I will conduct a nuanced analysis of the history of paramilitarism, showing 
how this label's common political associations do not fully capture the phenomenon's 
complex and multifaceted nature.  
In their explanations of the phenomenon of "new" armed groups and its links to 
paramilitarism, actors putting forth alternatives to the official state discourse seem to 
renegotiate the historical memory concerning paramilitary groups, countering the 
hegemonic state discourse that has historically shaped the conceptualization of 
paramilitarism. By shedding light on the economic and political structures that have 
fueled paramilitarism throughout its long history in the country, they are better able to 
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illustrate the ways in which these factors continue to be relevant in the current era. The 
dominant state-constructed account conceptualizes paramilitary groups as ones created 
and expanded mainly in response to guerrilla groups. However, alternate accounts 
understand the paramilitary phenomenon as the long-standing practice of utilizing private 
armies to protect the interests of groups such as landowners, entrepreneurs, and narcotics 
traffickers with the direct and indirect complicity of the state. In short, while the official 
historical account portrays paramilitarism as a purely ideological project, a nuanced 
analysis reveals the protection of political and economic interests as the main catalyst of 
paramilitary activity. Key informants inserted this project into a broader state-backed 
ideological and political process of violent capital accumulation. I will use the case study 
of Colombia to underscore the importance of contextualization in understanding the 
variegated and long-standing structures that fuel violence. More nuanced accounts of 
violence and its perpetrators allow for the development of more appropriate strategies and 
responses for dismantling the structures that engender such violence. 
THE POWER OF LABELS 
According to Tony Evans, a political scientist specializing in issues of 
international human rights, discourses "lend structure to our experiences and to the 
meanings we give to our experiences" (1049). This structure translates into a shaping of 
reality in the sense that discourses can incite specific actions. As Evans explains, 
discourses "provide sets of values and beliefs that inform our social responses and 
actions" (1050). In the context of the Colombian debate on paramilitarism, this means 
that the way in which perpetrators and their actions are labeled is extremely important in 
determining the way that the illicit acts they commit, such as human rights violations, are 
prosecuted and addressed or, in some cases, completely ignored. Legal experts Chalmers 
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and Leverick apply this idea to criminal proceedings, explaining that "offence names 
communicate information about the offender to a number of different bodies--- the 
public, agencies operating both within and outside the criminal justice system--
and...members of these groups may form opinions or make decisions about the offender 
that turn on the information received" (238).  In other words, labeling translates into 
specific courses of action with significant implications. In the more precise case of 
violence, naming immediately defines positions concerning such violence and determines 
the policies and actions that state and society will utilize to address it (Rueda 129).  
Applying this concept to the Colombian context shows how the labels of 
'BACRIM' and 'paramilitaries' incite contrasting social and legal responses. In naming 
these groups "criminal gangs," the government inherently places them in the category of 
organized crime or delinquency, arguing that they “lack the central structure and 
ideological base" of paramilitaries (Porch and Rasmussen 530).  The common distinction 
between political and common crime proposes that "participants in organized crime are 
motivated by their pursuit of profit, while armed insurgent groups use profits from crime 
as a means to support their political goals" (Saab and Taylor 457). Following such a 
definition, the government label of BACRIM discards the possibility of an ideological or 
political project as foundational to these armed groups. Additionally, because political 
crimes are more closely associated with human rights violations, this label automatically 
diverts attention from the possible human rights issues these groups may engender. In 
general, acts that are classified as human rights violations gain increased visibility, while 
illicit acts categorized as organized crime or common delinquency are quickly forgotten 
(Godoy 620). In other words, such a label can severely limit human rights victims' access 
to justice. Sociologist and human rights expert Angela Godoy gives specific examples in 
the case of human rights violations in Guatemala, describing circumstances in which the 
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government deliberately misclassified various assassinations with political implications 
as acts of common delinquency and, in this way, underplayed the gravity of the human 
rights violations that these acts represented (620).  
The word 'paramilitarism,' in turn, creates a direct link with a distinct historical 
phenomenon in Colombia. Naming these "new" groups "paramilitaries" automatically 
suggests that these groups do, indeed, commit human rights violations. Moreover, the 
label places particular emphasis on these violations, since paramilitaries notoriously 
committed approximately eighty percent of the human rights violations against civilians 
in the country (Hristov, "Legalizing the Illegal" 12). The ideological and political aspects 
that civil society associates with paramilitarism also underscore a connection to human 
rights issues. Referring to the current phenomenon of "new" armed groups, human rights 
groups claim that these actors show clear ideological stance in that they replicate the 
activities of paramilitaries and use “murder, torture, rape, and disappearances” to 
“persecute social movements” (Hristov, “Self-Defense Forces, Warlords, or Criminal 
Gangs?” 29). Additionally, paramilitary activity implies the complicity of “the state 
apparatus” in human rights violations (23). Such involvement is an essential aspect of the 
very definition of a human rights violation  (Godoy 621). In this sense, the 'paramilitary' 
label brings increased visibility to human rights violations and the state's complicity in 
these violations. Nonetheless, the paramilitary label's human rights implications are 
highlighted by a less visible civil society. It is the state that has defined the most common 
conceptualizations of the paramilitary label, simplifying the phenomenon to a violent 
ideological response to guerrilla groups.  
Given the starkly different social and legal consequences that each label entails 
and the power of the state in defining discourse, going beyond simple classification to 
nuanced contextualization is essential to appropriately addressing "new" armed groups, 
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accurately placing responsibility on all culprits, and responding to the human rights 
violations these groups potentially commit. If "the ways we think and talk about a subject 
influence the ways we act in relation that subject," then actively problematizing the 
discourse is an extremely important step in properly and holistically addressing "new" 
armed groups in Colombia (Karlberg 1). 
On the surface, the debate suggests a complete separation between political crime 
and organized crime. Nonetheless, while all organizations interviewed made an explicit 
link to the previous phenomenon of paramilitarism, their descriptions and 
conceptualizations of these "new" armed groups reflected a belief in the fusion between 
common and political crime. Such a fusion, they argued, has been characteristic of 
paramilitarism since its inception. For key informants, analyzing the phenomenon of 
"new" armed groups also necessitated a renegotiation of the historical memory 
concerning the paramilitary phenomenon. The key informants interviewed countered the 
state discourse on "new" armed groups by analyzing the motivations and structures that 
fueled paramilitarism in the country, disputing the historically established notion of 
paramilitarism as a political project with the ultimate end of defeating the guerrilla. The 
word "paramilitary" is, in itself, problematic and cannot capture the continued contention 
concerning the nature of these armed actors. The official discourse posits paramilitarism 
as a phenomenon defined by its counterinsurgency motivations, while many civil society 
organizations interpret paramilitarism as grounded in the protection of elite political and 
economic interests. For civil society, protecting such interests has always involved a 
fusion between political and organized crime, the widespread violation of human rights, 
and the involvement, whether by action or omission, of the state. In an article examining 
the similitudes and differences between criminality and armed groups, scholars Saab and 
Taylor give the example of Colombian paramilitary groups, showing how these groups' 
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involvement in drug trafficking, extortion, and kidnapping makes "the distinction 
between organized political criminals and criminal organized criminals...increasingly 
problematic" (qtd. in 470). In reexamining the history and structural motivations of 
paramilitarism, which debunk the notion of countering the insurgency as the primary 
catalyst of paramilitarism, the core argument sustaining the government's distinction 
between the BACRIM and paramilitaries becomes problematic. However, such a 
connection is difficult to understand solely through a surface analysis of discourse and 
labeling. 
Scholars that study the legal repercussions of the process of labeling argue that 
naming constrains the language to one that is "realist and legalistic," and "engage[s] in a 
decontextualization of events" that excludes the narrative essential to understanding "the 
motivation and intentionality of actors" (Wilson 134). In the Colombian context, the 
debate is reduced to a question of political crime versus common crime or delinquency, 
without any possible alternatives. Additionally, labeling is problematic because, as Tony 
Evans emphasizes, the "social world described by discourses always involves power 
relations" (1050). The Colombian media's silence in terms of the debate concerning these 
"new" armed groups and their passive acceptance of the state label of BACRIM 
underscores the power of the government in defining dominant societal perceptions.  The 
hegemonic discourse, produced by the state and reinforced by the media, exemplifies the 
government's power to "exclude, marginalize, silence, and prohibit alternatives" (Evans 
1050). The Colombian state's monopoly on naming these "new" armed groups is also 
indicative of its power in forming the historical memory concerning paramilitarism.  
Even brief examples of the beginnings of the modern paramilitary phenomenon 
show how the protection of private interests has always been the true motivation of 
paramilitarism, concealed behind the counterinsurgent discourse that defines the societal 
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understandings of these groups. Founded in 1981, the MAS (Muerte a Secuestradores or 
Death to Kidnappers) was the first modern expression of paramilitarism in Colombia. 
While founders claimed to create this paramilitary group to persecute guerrilla members 
who were kidnapping the families of narcotraffickers, members quickly began 
persecuting innocent civilians, including independent journalists, human rights defenders, 
judges, and labor unionists who denounced their actions ("Muerte a Secuestradores 
MAS").2 It is an alliance of politically and economically influential groups that made up 
the MAS, including powerful narcotics traffickers, landowners, politicians, businessmen, 
and a foreign oil company (González 13).  The alliance also included significant 
participation of the state, particularly high-ranked members of the armed forces ("Muerte 
a Secuestradores MAS"). The composition of the group is in itself indicative of the 
private interests that the group aimed to protect. The dominant presence of narcotics 
traffickers trumps the government definition of paramilitarism as a unidimensional 
counterinsurgent political phenomenon. As the example of the MAS shows, modern 
paramilitarism was engendered in the context of the drug trade (Fernández 121). The 
phenomenon demonstrates how a fusion between political crime and organized crime has 
been characteristic of the paramilitary phenomenon since its earliest modern expression. 
In silencing alternative historical interpretations of paramilitarism and monopolizing the 
definition of the phenomenon, the state is able to obscure this historical fusion and its 
own role in the exacerbation of violence. By deliberately misconstruing the historical 
memory concerning paramilitarism, the state conceals the connections between the 
previous phenomenon and the "new" one, the structural economic and political 
                                                
2 The example of the MAS will be addressed in more detail in Chapter 2. 
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motivations that continue to fuel these groups, and its own important role in powering the 
armed conflict. 
Reexamining the ideological, political, and economic structures of paramilitarism 
is crucial to understanding the connections between the current phenomenon and the 
previous one. The interviews present alternative interpretations that challenge the 
hegemonic state discourse, delegitimizing the separation between political and common 
crime and showing how violence that is labeled "delinquencia cloak[s]...forms of 
violence with important political implications" (Godoy 605). In this case, disassociating 
violence from its long-standing and systematic motivations makes violence appear 
inchoate, and does not accurately expose the specific structural, economic, and political 
interests that fuel it. This, in turn, allows the violence to continue. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
A keen interest in human rights, a discomfort in unwittingly accepting the 
hegemonic discourse of criminal gangs, and an observation of the need for a more 
nuanced understanding of the long-standing structural causes of the manifestations of 
violence in Colombia are the inspiration for this research project. To this end, I traveled 
to Bogotá and Medellín from June to August of 2012 and conducted fourteen interviews 
with human rights organizations, an intergovernmental organization, state 
representatives, and journalists, all actors that actively participate in the state and civil 
society debate. Out of the total of fourteen, eight interviews were with representatives of 
Colombian human rights organizations. These included the Corporación Nuevo Arcoiris, 
Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular (CINEP), Comisión Intereclesial de Justicia 
y Paz, Grupo Interdisciplinario por los Derechos Humanos (GIDH), Instituto de Estudios 
de Desarrollo y Paz (Indepaz), Comisión Colombiana de Juristas (Coljuristas), Colectivo 
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de Abogados José Alvear Restrepo (Colectivo), and Fundación Ideas para la Paz (FIP). I 
also interviewed the head of the Impunity Section at the Colombian Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Other civil society informants included 
two journalists, both representing the online news source Verdad Abierta, a website 
dedicated primarily to analyzing and reporting on paramilitarism in Colombia. I also 
interviewed a representative of the Colombian Human Rights Ombudsman's Office, a 
mediating organization between state and civil society focusing solely on human rights 
issues in the country. Finally, I conducted interviews with two state agents: one a 
representative of the human rights sector of the Colombian Presidency and the other a 
fiscal (judge) based in the Justice Department (Fiscalía) of Medellín.  
As the distribution of the interviews shows, I captured more of the non-state 
perspective on the "new" armed groups than the position of the Colombian government. 
In part, this was based on my previous experience in human rights work and a more 
developed network of contacts in the field. 3 Additionally, human rights organizations 
were extremely open to granting me an interview. In contrast, it was extremely difficult 
to establish contact with state agencies. Among the state institutions I contacted were the 
Ministry of the Interior, the Colombian National Justice Department, the Justicia y Paz 
section of the Justice Department, the National Police, the Antioquia Departmental 
Police, the Criminal Investigation Department of the National Police (SIJIN), and the 
Office of the Inspector General. I received no affirmative response from any of the 
individuals I contacted in these agencies. In some cases, I was told that the BACRIM was 
not in their area of expertise. In other instances, the process for scheduling an interview 
                                                
3 I established many of my contacts through the Latin America Working Group and through the director of 
the UT Austin Law School Human Rights Clinic, Ariel Dulitzky, whose established trajectory in the field 
of human rights in Latin America was invaluable in my ability to approach many individuals in the 
Colombian human rights network 
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was highly bureaucratic, and my limited time in the country did not allow enough time to 
navigate this bureaucracy. 4 In most cases, however, agencies remained completely silent; 
I received no response at all.  
While I was able to speak with two individuals who worked in government 
agencies, they were clear in distancing themselves from their official posts, speaking 
personally rather than on behalf of the agency they represented. Fabio Ruiz, the 
representative of the human rights sector of the Presidency, stressed various times 
throughout the interview that he was speaking as a sociologist and that his analysis did 
not represent the opinion of the Presidential Program on Human Rights. The judge that I 
interviewed in Medellín insisted that we not meet in the Fiscalía; she did not allow me to 
record the interview and asked to remain anonymous. She informed me that she was 
extremely critical of the Justice Department and the government in general and was 
fearful of the possible repercussions of openly speaking out against them. I came into 
contact with her through the director of one of the human rights organizations 
participating in my research project, the Grupo Interdisciplinario por los Derechos 
Humanos in Medellín. In general, the fiscal's positions aligned with those of human 
rights organizations. In sum, my interviews with state officials did not truly represent the 
official state positions on paramilitarism and "new" armed groups. Nonetheless, the 
silence on the part of the state is, in itself, significant and I will address it later in this 
work. In any case, the interviews with the two state officials provided valuable insight 
into the reasons behind the state discourse on the paramilitary phenomenon and "new" 
armed actors. I will supplement my limited state interaction by utilizing information in 
                                                
4 For example, the individual I contacted in the office of the National Police in Bogotá informed me that I 
needed to submit a formal request for an interview. However, he stressed the fact that the office received 
500 information requests per day and told me that I was unlikely to hear back before my departure. I 
submitted the request, but as of the time of this writing, I had not received any communication from the 
National Police.   
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official government documents and secondary sources in order to represent the state 
position.  
ORGANIZATION OF CHAPTERS 
In Chapter Two, I will utilize the interview data as the basis for a detailed 
historical analysis of paramilitarism in Colombia, focusing on the economic and political 
structures that fuel the phenomenon.5 In Chapter Three, I will use the interviews as a 
starting point for an examination of the effectiveness of the paramilitary demobilization 
process and analyze the "new" armed groups in relation to paramilitaries, demonstrating 
how the same political and economic structures drive the actions of both groups. Finally, 
in Chapter Four I will conclude by stressing the importance of more detailed 
contextualization, rather than a tacit internalization of the dominant discourse, in 
developing a more accurate historical memory of the ongoing conflict in Colombia and in 
dismantling the structures that fuel violence in the country. Through this research project, 
I will contribute to a more rigorous and nuanced examination of the nature of 
paramilitarism in Colombia in order to ensure that the ways in which the phenomenon is 
conceptualized and represented reflect the political and economic structures that sustain 
it, the serious human rights issues that it engenders, the state's complicity, and its 
continued relevance in the current era. 
  
                                                
5 All direct quotes taken from the key informant interviews conducted by the author in Bogotá and 
Medellín will be presented in their original Spanish version. 
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Chapter 2: Paramilitarism in Retrospect 
CAPITAL ACCUMULATION 
I met with journalist Juan Diego Restrepo at Unicentro, a noisy and crowded 
shopping center in the busy Conquistadores neighborhood of Medellín. As we sat 
drinking an afternoon tinto, I asked about his background and specific coverage of the 
armed conflict. He described his investigative work with Verdad Abierta, an online portal 
specializing in conflict reporting. The organization's main focus is the monitoring and 
analysis of the Justice and Peace process, which guided the demobilization of 
paramilitaries in 2005.  Taking advantage of his specialized knowledge of the peace 
process, I asked him to describe the differences between the "new" armed groups--known 
officially as BACRIM--and the supposedly demobilized paramilitary groups. He replied 
saying that there was significant continuity between the two phenomena and rejected the 
state's characterization of the BACRIM as actors whose motives are completely different 
from those of paramilitaries. He criticized the way in which the state conceptualizes the 
BACRIM in direct opposition to paramilitarism and rejected the state claim that these 
"new" armed groups are more involved in narcotics trafficking and other activities of 
organized crime than paramilitaries. Restrepo's critique was also historical; he contested 
the conceptualization of paramilitaries as a purely political phenomenon dedicated to 
combatting guerrilla groups. Summarizing his skepticism concerning the state's argument 
for the criminal nature of the BACRIM in opposition to the purely counterinsurgent 
political nature of paramilitaries, he stated:  
Las AUC también fueron narcos. La gran discusión que hay con el gobierno 
nacional es que le [atribuyan] a las Bacrim un negocio que las AUC también 
tenían. ¿Cuál es el cambio ahí? Ninguno! ¿Dónde están los jefes de las AUC? 
Condenados por narcotráfico. ¿Entonces como así que las BACRIM son 
narcotráfico y las AUC no? El negocio se mantiene en las estructuras armadas 
ilegales. 
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Restrepo's assertion echoed an interview I had carried out two weeks earlier, but 
in an extremely different setting.  At that meeting, I sat drinking my tinto in a small and 
quiet conference room. To my left was a wide window through which I could see a large 
stone courtyard. A short distance beyond it, I had a clear view of the Casa de Nariño, 
Colombia's presidential palace. I sat in the main offices of the Presidencia, the Colombian 
executive branch, in the bustling capital city of Bogotá. Directly facing me was Fabio 
Ruiz, a bookish and energetic young professional working with the Presidential Program 
on Human Rights.  With the patriotic fanfare of the band of the Presidential Guard 
blaring at an outdoor ceremony at the neighboring Casa de Nariño, Fabio Ruiz stated: 
Una opinión más como sociólogo que funcionario público...los paramilitares eran 
una estructura armada que con pretexto de combatir la guerrilla lo que estaban 
haciendo era buscando controlar una serie de negocios [emphasis added]. 
Ruiz's opinion was extremely important, showing a clear break with the official 
state discourse, which cemented the idea of paramilitary groups as a purely ideological 
phenomenon in response to left-wing guerrillas. By having to distance himself from his 
state affiliation, he recognized that he was contradicting the official position on 
paramilitarism through his claim. His detached stance as a sociologist rendered his 
criticism and questioning of the discourse more objective, giving the statement more 
credibility. In a similar manner, civil society interviewees reflected on and rejected the 
state-formed account of paramilitarism in Colombia. As the information from the 
interviews shows, the debate concerning the nature of "new" armed groups symbolized an 
opportunity to problematize and offer alternatives to the official historical interpretation 
of paramilitarism. 
 The following chapter will review the history of paramilitarism in Colombia 
according to the alternative discourses that interviewees presented. The analysis will 
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focus on the economic and political structures of paramilitarism, as put forth through 
these conceptualizations. Such an analysis will problematize the political crime and 
organized crime dichotomy that the state posits as the defining difference between 
paramilitaries and "new" armed groups. The alternate discourse reveals the political and 
economic motivations that have historically fueled paramilitary activity, which can be 
understood in terms of a larger political project that directly involves the state. Such an 
analysis is crucial in understanding the connections between the previous phenomenon 
and the current one. Presently, it is the state that monopolizes the semantics defining the 
limits of the debate.  If society understands paramilitarism as a counterinsurgent political 
project and passively accepts the BACRIM as a phenomenon of organized crime, then the 
deeply rooted and systematic connections between the two phenomena are nearly 
impossible to recognize. 
When I entered the offices of the Comisión Intereclesial de Justicia y Paz in 
Bogotá, I immediately witnessed the type of human rights advocacy work that 
characterizes the organization. I observed as a staff attorney welcomed two women who 
arrived in the city from a rural municipality. They wanted to file a claim for restitution of 
their land, from which paramilitary groups had forcibly displaced them. In my interview 
with Abilio Peña, a representative of the organization, he confirmed the NGO's emphasis 
on the issue of forced displacement and Justicia y Paz's work in accompanying 
communities that are in rural areas vulnerable to violence and displacement. Peña 
explained to me his conceptualization of the paramilitary phenomenon, calling it a 
historically economic strategy. Reinaldo Villalba, an attorney from the vocal organization 
Colectivo de Abogados, seemed to further explain Peña's assertion, defining 
paramilitarism as "una estrategia de estado para lograr propósitos esencialmente 
económicos de despojo, de desplazamiento de población para favorecer los grandes 
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capitales." Villalba defined paramilitarism as a phenomenon based on the execution of a 
process of capital accumulation. His description implied the insertion of the phenomenon 
into a larger state-backed economic project. Like Villalba, many other informants 
connected paramilitarism and its violent practices to the logic of capital accumulation.  
The neoliberal project is the articulation of this process in the most recent expressions of 
the paramilitary phenomenon. By underscoring the systematic economic interests that 
have historically fueled paramilitarism, informants' alternate discourses emphasized state 
complicity in the phenomenon and the ways in which organized criminal activities and 
human rights violations are inserted in a broader state-sponsored project in defense of 
elite economic interests.  
In the first volume of his seminal work, Capital, Karl Marx underscores the 
importance of violence to capital accumulation, explaining that " capital comes dripping 
from head to foot, from every pore, with blood and dirt" (834). He goes on to explain the 
longstanding practice of utilizing violence as a means for capital accumulation, 
describing "the robbery of the common lands, the usurpation of feudal and clan property, 
and its transformation into modern private property under circumstances of reckless 
terrorism" as "methods of primitive accumulation" (805). Marx goes on to explain that 
this violent consolidation of land ownership into the hands of a few proprietors ultimately 
serves practices of "capitalistic agriculture" (805). The system of capital accumulation is 
one that favors private interests and unbridled profit. As Villalba expressed, these long-
standing practices of accumulation of capital have been a trademark of paramilitary 
activity since its earliest expressions. Most recently, it is the neoliberal project that is the 
modern manifestation of capital accumulation and the violent practices that accompany it. 
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NEOLIBERALISM AND ACCUMULATION BY DISPOSSESSION 
Neoliberalism is an economic system that promotes notions of individual 
entrepreneurship and unbridled economic growth (Peet, "Neoliberalism").  According to 
David Harvey, this system "proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by 
liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional 
framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade" 
(A Brief History of Neoliberalism 2). The process discourages state regulation and 
encourages private enterprise, placing emphasis on "competition over cooperation and in 
doing so encourag[ing] each individual to pursue his or her own well being" (Sukys 4). 
While neoliberalism's projects and policies are economic in nature, the ideas that found it 
are deeply political and ideological. In defending the project, proponents describe the 
system as universally beneficial, arguing that "market forces of supply and demand 
allocate resources efficiently in the long run, in the sense of minimizing costs and 
maximizing consumer satisfaction" (Peet, Unholy Trinity 5). Economically, the 
promotion of individual entrepreneurial freedoms and competition translates into the 
advancement of an "outward-oriented, export economy" that is organized through 
markets along with privatization and free trade (14). As these specific policies show, 
profit, efficiency, and competition are the guiding principles of the neoliberal process. 
Despite the primacy of the free market, the state has an important role in creating the 
institutional conditions to promote such a system. As Harvey argues, the state must 
secure the "military, defense, police, and legal structures...to secure private property 
rights" and "guarantee by force, if need be, the proper functioning of markets" (A Brief 
History of Neoliberalism 2). In short, the state is an extremely important player in 
assuring the optimal conditions for the implementation of neoliberal policies. In the 
particular case of Colombia, the state has been formally endorsing and applying 
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substantial neoliberal reforms since the early 1990s, committing to a program of market 
liberalization as a condition for loans (The Struggle for Workers' Rights 8). 
Despite proponents' claims that the policies characteristic of neoliberalism lead to 
an economic situation that benefits everyone, critics of the neoliberal model argue just the 
opposite, saying that the economic system is ultimately one that harms many and benefits 
a select few. Scholars argue that violence is an important part of the neoliberal project 
and imperative in securing maximum growth and profit. The process of "accumulation by 
dispossession," a term coined by David Harvey, is one of the visible manifestations of 
violence resulting from neoliberal policies and practices. The term refers to a process of 
accumulation of goods or commodities through "predation, fraud, or violence" (Harvey, 
The New Imperialism 144). Harvey adapts this definition directly from Marx's description 
of violent "primitive accumulation" in the capitalist system, effectively showing how the 
neoliberal project is the continued manifestation of established processes of capitalist 
accumulation. In direct continuity with the specific practices of primitive accumulation 
that Marx describes, accumulation by dispossession includes "the commodification and 
privatization of land and the forceful expulsion of peasant populations" (Harvey, The 
New Imperialism 145). The neoliberal process is one of " creative destruction," required 
to make way for a completely "new infrastructure for market-oriented economic growth, 
commodification, and the rule of capital" (Brenner and Theodore 362). In Colombia, the 
extension of neoliberal reform through liberalization and decentralization in 1990 
coincided with an intensification of paramilitary violence characterized by egregious 
human violations against civilians (Forero 15). More specifically, historical practices of 
capital accumulation by dispossession, including violent land-grabbing and internal 
displacement committed by paramilitaries, worsened in the context of the increased focus 
on the protection and promotion of private interests intrinsic to the neoliberal process 
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(Hristov, "Legalizing the Illegal" 14).  In essence, violence is a practice that is in line 
with capitalist and neoliberal logic, being the most efficient process for creating a 
business climate that is optimal for the implementation of policies that favor privatization 
and growth for the benefit of a small but powerful elite (Harvey, "Time Space 
Compression" 86). Because the state is an essential player in establishing this optimal 
climate, it is inherently complicit in the violence that capital accumulation generates. 
By connecting paramilitarism to the principles and values that characterize long-
standing practices of capitalist accumulation, interviewees emphasized the complicity of 
the state in the human rights violations that result from paramilitary practices of 
accumulation by dispossession. Through a contextualization of paramilitarism that 
challenges the phenomenon's most common connotations, informants contested the state's 
hegemonic position in the construction of the historical account of the civil conflict. 
HISTORICAL PATTERNS OF PARAMILITARISM 
In hushed tones, seemingly worried that her words could be heard through the 
office walls, a fiscal working in the Fiscalía of Medellín asked me not to audio record our 
interview or note her name in my research. We met in the offices of the Grupo 
Interdisciplinario por los Derechos Humanos in order to ensure her safety. The director, 
María Victoria Fallon, was a friend of the fiscal. Before we began the interview, the fiscal 
explained to me the source of her fear. She was under constant threat because of the harsh 
sentences she gave to individual members of paramilitary groups and because of her 
resistance to taking part in corrupt practices in the Fiscalía. While I am certain that she 
told me her first name at the time, I did not write it down, and even at the time of this 
writing, I cannot recall it. She is, even to me, completely anonymous. She told me that 
this anonymity was an essential condition for her ability to be sincere. Her candidness 
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was evident from the start of the interview, when she called paramilitarism "un proyecto 
para-estado," suggesting the state's institutionalized connections to paramilitary groups. 
 The Colombian Commission of Jurists (Coljuristas), an organization active in 
litigating Colombian human rights cases in national and international courts, echoed the 
fiscal's assertions. The organization's representative, attorney Federico Andreu, described 
paramilitaries as originally "organizados por el ejercito [y] el estado." As various 
informants remarked, the idea of arming the civilian population was a recommendation 
from the United States during the Cold War. Recent research shows that "Washington 
pressured the Colombian government to adopt a paramilitary strategy towards those 
challenging Capitalism's right to assert economic and political hegemony" (Zarate-Laun 
4). As the trajectory shows, paramilitarism has, since its inception, been grounded in the 
defense of private economic interests, ones that correlate directly with the capitalist logic 
historically encouraged and promoted by the state. 
Recent analyses of the earliest manifestations of paramilitarism, which predate the 
Cold War and the emergence of guerrilla groups, support this interpretation of the 
original motivations of paramilitarism as entrenched in the protection of private interests, 
with the overwhelming support of the state. These expressions of paramilitary violence 
occurred in the Violencia period, a decades-long bloody era of violence in the country 
most commonly understood as an ideological war between the liberal and conservative 
parties. In her analysis of La Violencia, historian Mary Roldan contests the dominant 
historical account of the period, saying that “mid-twentieth century violence was not the 
spontaneous result of inherent local partisan conflict but was rather consciously spear-
headed by selective sectors of the regional state or tacitly encouraged by local bosses to 
advance interests that had little or nothing to do with ideological differences” (286). She 
goes on to argue that these interests were largely private, and centered mainly on gaining 
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or maintaining control of land and valuable natural resources (292). Furthermore, she 
emphasizes the role of the state in advancing or supporting these interests. In essence, 
Roldan describes a process of capitalist accumulation in the violence perpetrated by 
armed groups during the La Violencia era and, similar to the informants, challenges the 
state-formed discourse that centers on political ideology as the primary force behind 
violence.  
Historian Edgar Velásquez Rivera more specifically analyses the role of 
paramilitarism during the Violencia era. He gives the example of the emergence of 
paramilitary groups known as pájaros during this period, and attributes their existence to 
elites' need for violence in acquiring and maintaining ownership of land and their 
privileged economic positions, all in complicity with state authorities (Velásquez 137).  
Such practices illustrate the violent processes of expulsion of populations that Marx 
describes, which create "great landed proprietors" (814). As Velásquez emphasizes, 
paramilitarism was an essential agent in the process of capital accumulation during the 
Violencia era. 
In our interview at his organization's offices in Bogotá, Teófilo Vásquez of the 
Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular (CINEP) explained to me the forces behind 
more modern expressions of paramilitarism in Colombia. He said that, "las elites locales 
atajadas tanto a economías legales como a economías ilegales [necesitan] para apuntalar 
su orden social, su coerción y su acaparamiento de oportunidades...de grupos armados." 
Vásquez's argument concerning paramilitarism  directly echoed Velásquez's description 
of the driving force behind paramilitary groups during the Violencia period.  Vásquez 
argued that paramilitaries fulfill an important demand, one that is completely linked to 
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the protection of the legal and illegal economic interests of various groups of elite actors.6 
The following sections will elaborate more specifically on the licit and illicit economic 
interests that have historically fueled the violent actions of paramilitary groups in 
Colombia.  
I interviewed key informant Carlos Prieto of the Fundación Ideas para la Paz 
(FIP) in the offices of his organization in Bogotá. He is the head of the Conflict and 
Peace division of the organization, which examines and monitors the actions of both 
guerrilla and paramilitary groups in the country. Prieto's analysis of the paramilitary 
project centered on the phenomenon's expressions in the early 1980s; he described these 
groups as "el brazo armado de los carteles." Prieto's analysis underscored the historically 
important role of narcotrafficking, classified as an act of organized crime, to paramilitary 
groups' modus operandi. In a busy news office in the center of Bogotá, journalist Cesar 
Molinares, the editor of the news source Verdad Abierta, echoed Prieto in explaining that 
modern paramilitarism was born as a phenomenon sponsored by narcotrafficking. 7 
Molinares cited the example of the group Muerte a Secuestradores (MAS), defining it as 
a conglomeration of narcotics traffickers, businessmen, and landowners that formed a 
private army with the pretext of defending themselves from the guerilla. The November 
1981 kidnapping of Martha Nieves Ochoa incited the creation of this paramilitary group. 
She was the sister of Fabio, Jorge Luis, and David Ochoa, all members of an 
economically elite family involved in the horse-breeding business. The three Ochoa 
brothers were also prominent members of the Medellín Cartel, Pablo Escobar's powerful 
                                                
6 The validity of Vásquez's statement seems to be supported by CINEP's work. The organizations has been 
keeping a comprehensive database of human rights violations committed by state and non-state actors since 
the early 1980s. Vásquez's twenty-year tenure at this organization has allowed him to learn to recognize the 
patterns and structures of violence in Colombia. 
7 The similarities between Molinares' and Prieto's arguments are unsurprising. Verdad Abierta is a project 
sponsored by the FIP. 
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narcotrafficking organization. The MAS' economically elite membership, the strong 
presence of actors of organized crime, as well as their indiscriminately violent actions, 
quickly disqualified the supposed counterinsurgent ideology of the group. The MAS not 
only targeted guerillas, but also journalists, judges, human rights defenders, and labor 
unionists who denounced their violent and illicit practices ("Muerte a Secuestradores 
MAS").  
Prieto of the FIP went on to describe the composition of what he termed the 
second generation of paramilitary groups. During the mid-1990s, paramilitary leaders and 
brothers Carlos and Vicente Castaño led the consolidation of localized paramilitary 
groups into the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, more commonly known as the 
AUC. Carlos Castaño claimed that the AUC had a clear political project focused on 
combating insurgent guerrilla groups (Chernick). All of the informants questioned the 
legitimacy and sincerity of this counterinsurgent project as the motivation of the AUC. 
They conceptualized these armed groups as ones fueled by the protection of private 
interests, emphasizing these actors' particular investment in the narcotrafficking business. 
Fabio Ruiz was cynical in his analysis of the motivations of the AUC and its leadership, 
explaining that "Los Castaño eran narcotraficantes puros y de pronto resultaron siendo 
grupos de autodefensa de extrema derecha con posiciones políticas!" Ruiz went on to 
question the frequently cited personal motivations of the AUC, saying that anyone who 
truly understands the situation in Colombia will not believe the often-told story of " lo 
fuerte que fue la guerrilla contra [las] familias [de los Castaño] o cómo vivieron la 
extorsión, el secuestro, el asesinato de familiares y por eso ellos tienen resentimiento 
contra la guerrilla y están luchando por un país libre." Proponents of the official discourse 
concerning historical paramilitarism often cite the Castaño family's history with the 
guerrilla in support of the claim that counterinsurgent ideology was the brothers' main 
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incentive for forming a paramilitary group. Guerrilla groups were responsible for the 
death of the Castaño brothers' father in 1981 (Kirk). 
 However, historical evidence supports Ruiz' cynicism concerning the brothers' 
motivations. The eldest Castaño brother, Fidel, who was instrumental in the formation of 
modern paramilitary groups but disappeared before the groups' consolidation into the 
AUC, told the media that he hated his father and that his motives for persecuting the 
guerrilla were not founded upon ideological or personal reasons.  Instead, his hatred for 
the guerrilla owed to the fact that these groups "got in his way" (Kirk). Castaño's 
persecution of guerrillas transferred easily to anyone else who interfered with his 
economic interests. He and his family possessed extreme wealth, profiting from cattle 
sales, extensive land ownership, and the lucrative cocaine trade (Kirk). Fidel's brother 
Carlos eventually became a member of the Medellín Cartel (Forero 12). As evidence 
demonstrates, narcotrafficking is a historically characteristic practice of paramilitarism, 
showing the importance of unbridled profitmaking to the actions of paramilitary groups.  
The composition of such groups also underscores the elite origins of paramilitaries; the 
Castaño family belonged to a rich landowning class, a fact that brings to mind the 
composition of elite groups that funded and participated in paramilitary activity during 
the Violencia period. 
The importance of narcotrafficking to the paramilitary activity of first and second-
generation groups demonstrates the long trajectory of organized crime in the context of 
paramilitarism. As Carlos Prieto of FIP explained, this debunks the state's dichotomous 
distinction between organized crime and illegal armed groups as the guiding principle for 
the disassociation of "new" armed groups from the phenomenon of paramilitarism. In 
linking paramilitarism to narcotics trafficking, interviewees underscored the important 
criminal underpinnings of the phenomenon. As key informants argued, paramilitaries are 
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motivated by profit making in itself, an important characteristic of organized criminals 
(Saab and Taylor 457). Fidel Castaño's statement is a case in point; the paramilitary 
leader admitted to persecuting guerrilla members because he considered them to be an 
obstacle to his economic interests, not because of an ideological difference or a form of 
revenge against his father's death. Key informant Angelica Arias of the Corporación 
Arcoiris echoed this point more generally, saying that the AUC only confronted the 
guerrilla to take over their territory and "ganar espacio para poder desarrollar negocios 
ilícitos." The paramilitaries' actions were motivated by a defense of their business 
enterprises, rather than an ideological project against the guerrilla.  
Nevertheless, this fundamental interest in economic profit also forms part of a 
larger political and economic project. Narcotrafficking, an act of organized crime with 
purely economic motives, is simultaneously part of a larger state-sponsored mission. The 
paramilitary strategy aimed at profitmaking fits within the political ideals and values of 
capitalism. Abilio Peña of the Comisión Intereclesial de Justicia y Paz made this 
implication when he called the paramilitary project "una apuesta económica [y] un 
proyecto político." The business of narcotrafficking folds itself neatly into the Colombian 
state's neoliberal project. As one scholar argues, " la estrategia bélica [de las AUC] está 
motivada por el negocio del narcotráfico" (Fernández 125, emphasis added). As Peña 
explained, the beneficiaries of paramilitary violence are primarily powerful empresarios, 
which include businessmen invested in the narcotrafficking business. This assertion 
underscores the intentionality of the paramilitary project and the way in which the 
economic motives of paramilitarism also represent a deliberate defense of elite and 
private interests. As Peña suggested, paramilitarism benefits economic actors that work 
under the values of competition, profitmaking, and unbridled growth that neoliberalism 
promotes.  
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The principles of privatization and uninhibited growth that the neoliberal system 
promotes actually foment and encourage narcotrafficking, making clear the connection 
between organized crime and a broader political project. Narcotrafficking can be framed 
within Colombia's insertion into the world economy and the transition to neoliberalism 
(Forero 12). The highly lucrative and export-oriented nature of narcotics trafficking fits 
the characteristics of neoliberalism, which promotes an increasingly export-oriented 
market as a precursor to unfettered growth and profit. Interestingly, Forero challenges the 
legal classification of narcotrafficking as delinquency or crime, borrowing from another 
Colombian scholar in saying that these actors can be classified as "empresarios de la 
coerción" (qtd. in 22, emphasis added).  In short, narcotraffickers work within the logic 
of capital accumulation, most recently articulated through the neoliberal system. The 
AUC itself admitted to an adherence to the ideas of unbridled growth, individualism, and 
capital accumulation, defining itself as "an anticommunist advance guard in defense of 
private property and free enterprise" and offering "their security model to landowners 
and businessmen" (qtd. in Saab and Taylor 461, emphasis added).  The very mission 
statement of the AUC underscores their support for the principles of capitalism and 
neoliberalism, questions their purely counterinsurgent motives, and reveals their 
multifaceted political and criminal underpinnings. 
In addition to their involvement in narcotrafficking, paramilitaries' defense of 
legal private businesses through violence and accumulation by dispossession also makes 
more evident the connections between the phenomenon and the logic of capital 
accumulation. Such support goes back to the Violencia period, when private landowners 
created militias to displace peasants and make way for ranching and large-scale 
agriculture (Chomsky 92). Practices of capitalist accumulation by dispossession have 
been relevant throughout paramilitarism's long history. Informants suggested the 
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continuity of these historical practices in their accounts of the modern paramilitary 
phenomenon. Teófilo Vásquez spoke of large landowners, agroindustry, and 
multinationals as some of the intellectual authors behind forced displacement. Fabio Ruiz 
accused large-scale enterprises of using paramilitaries as private armies to guard their 
economic interests. Abilio Peña of the Comisión de Justicia y Paz mentioned some of the 
private sector enterprises historically implicated in paramilitary violence, including 
agroindustry, infrastructure, energy sector projects, telecommunications, and mining. 
Evidence supports informants' assertions of the vast extent of private involvement in the 
paramilitary phenomenon. According to the independent think tank Indepaz, over 100 
Colombian corporations and multinationals are linked in various ways to paramilitary 
groups (Seeboldt and Salinas 24). As evidence demonstrates, protecting private 
enterprise--a key aspect of the neoliberal project-- is an important part of the paramilitary 
endeavor. This systematic collaboration between legal business and violent 
paramilitarism more directly implicates the larger project of accumulation in the 
exacerbation of the violent armed conflict in Colombia. The role of this larger project, in 
turn, suggests the complicity of the state in paramilitarism. It is the state that creates the 
necessary conditions and implements the required policies to create an optimal climate 
for neoliberal accumulation. 
NAMING THE CULPRIT(S): PARAMILITARISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
I interviewed attorney Reinaldo Villalba, a vocal member of the human rights 
organization Colectivo de Abogados José Alvear Restrepo, at the organization's offices in 
Bogotá. Villalba spoke with uninhibited passion about the injustices and human rights 
violations perpetrated by paramilitary groups in Colombia. The Colectivo, as it is known 
throughout the country, is recognized as one of the most outspoken denouncers of state 
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involvement in paramilitary activity. Villalba and his colleagues receive frequent threats 
against their personal safety and that of their families. During our interview, he seemed 
completely unfazed by this fact, speaking candidly about injustice in the country. He 
denounced the fact that the victims of paramilitary groups are primarily civilians, despite 
these armed groups' claims that their victims are members of insurgent groups. Villalba 
told me, "la guerrilla era [en realidad] la población civil. El alcalde que no se 
comprometía a entregarles recursos [a los paramilitares], que no se comprometía a 
entregarles burocracia, que no se comprometía a guardar silencio sobre sus actividades 
criminales." Statistics support this assertion; as was previously mentioned, these armed 
groups commit approximately eighty percent of the human rights violations against 
civilians in the country (Hristov, "Legalizing the Illegal" 12). By emphasizing the rights 
abuses for which paramilitaries are responsible, Villalba implicitly underscored the state's 
complicity in paramilitarism, given that the involvement of the state is characteristic of 
human rights violations (Godoy 621).  In focusing on paramilitary human rights 
violations, Villalba denounced the responsibility of the state in the prolongation of the 
civil conflict by its direct actions and indirect involvement, including the promotion of a 
notoriously violent system of capital accumulation and a failure to prevent or prosecute 
gross violations of human rights.  
 Key informants largely agreed on the specific human rights violations that 
characterize paramilitarism. Villalba described the armed groups' modus operandi as one 
characterized by threats against the population, forced displacement, massacres, and the 
destruction of social organizations, including human rights organizations that denounce 
paramilitarism. Luis Alberto Bonilla of the Human Rights Ombudsman's office, Angélica 
Arias, Federico Andreu, and the anonymous judge in Medellín all echoed Villalba in 
emphasizing the relevance of the issue of displacement to the paramilitary project. 
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Villalba, along with various other informants, also noted paramilitary responsibility in the 
assassination of and threats against unionists. Informants linked these human rights 
violations to the state-backed protection of the economic interests of powerful actors. 
They described paramilitaries as the executors of a state-sponsored process of 
accumulation by dispossession. The following sections will focus on two of the most 
prominent foci for key informants in their discussion of paramilitary human rights 
violations--- forced displacement and the persecution and assassination of labor unionists. 
The sections will examine the violations as logical tactics of state-supported neoliberal 
expansion that represent the creative destruction necessary to eliminate any factor 
contrary to the principles of uninhibited growth and profit. 
At the offices of the Grupo Interdisciplinario por los Derechos Humanos in 
Medellín, director María Victoria Fallon highlighted the persecution and assassination of 
labor unionists as an important part of the repertoire of violence of paramilitary groups. 
Villalba also touched on this persecution of organized labor in his interview, pointing out 
that over 60% of assassinated union laborers in the world are Colombian. In underscoring 
the connections between paramilitarism and violence against labor unionists, key 
informants made implicit connections between the economic and political project of 
neoliberalism and the phenomenon of paramilitarism. The disciplining of labor is 
essential to the creative destruction required for neoliberal growth and efficiency 
(Harvey, "The Right to the City" 24).  The assassination of and threats against unionists 
are the "assault on organized working class power" required for a full transition to 
neoliberal capital accumulation, which demands low wages and temporary working 
conditions for the sake of maximizing growth and efficiency (24). In connecting these 
violations to the larger state-sponsored project of accumulation, informants made clear 
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the state's systematic involvement in paramilitary activity and their inherent 
responsibility for grave violations of human rights committed by paramilitary groups. 
Reinaldo Villalba specifically mentioned the Coca Cola Company's involvement 
and support of paramilitary violence. Between 1990 and 2005, a period coinciding with 
the government's official commitment to and expansion of neoliberal globalization in the 
country, paramilitary groups assassinated nine Coca Cola employees affiliated to the 
National Union of Food Industry Workers, SINALTRAINAL, and were responsible for 
human rights violations against 180 other workers. These violations included threats, 
torture, and forced displacement (SINALTRAINAL Vs. Coca Cola 2). According to 
testimonies, the Coca Cola Company "hired, contracted with, or otherwise directed 
paramilitary security forces" that committed these violations against workers and their 
families (2). Union investigators linked the periods of highest paramilitary violence 
against unionists and their families with times in which contract negotiations were taking 
place at bottling plants (Gill 112). Paramilitary violence against unionists sponsored by 
legal business represents an unyielding adherence to the "supra-capitalist creed" of 
"growth" that guides the neoliberal process (Starr 21).  Unionized labor is inconsistent 
with the current system's tenets because of its demands for higher wages, stable contracts, 
and increased benefits. As a consequence of the violence, the SINALTRAINAL union 
lost approximately half of its membership (Gill 111). Paramilitary violence, in this case, 
represented the most efficient means to discipline labor, leading to economic growth and 
profit for the company. In emphasizing the relevance of this labor disciplining to the 
violent actions of paramilitary groups, key informants inserted these groups into a larger 
political and economic project. In this way, they questioned the validity of the official 
discourse on paramilitarism, underscoring these groups' ultimate interest in profitmaking 
and marking their strong links to the state. 
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These state connections, as many informants pointed out, extend beyond the 
sponsorship of the economic project of capital accumulation. Informants also accused the 
state of facilitating overwhelming impunity for human rights violations. The impunity in 
cases of violence against trade unionists underscores this type of state responsibility for 
human rights violations. Anthropologist Leslie Gill explains that the violent strategy of 
disciplining labor is "facilitated by pervasive impunity" (110). As of 2008, only five 
individuals had been convicted for the more than 4000 murders of trade unionists that 
occurred in Colombia since 1986; such a figure demonstrates an impunity rate of nearly 
100% (110). The state's inaction and lack of persecution of paramilitaries involved in 
these grave violations of human rights facilitates the repetition of these violations. Angela 
Godoy argues that the state's inaction is itself a human rights violation, explaining that 
"the most immediate threats to [citizens'] well being stem not from what the state does, 
but from what it does not do" (621). Sociologist Jasmin Hristov contextualizes this 
concept in the Colombian case, explaining that the "most common way in which the 
state...has collaborated with the AUC has been through nonintervention" (Blood and 
Capital 83). In the case of Colombian trade unionism, not only does the state condone 
human rights violations through its promotion of the neoliberal economic system, but 
also through a near total impunity in the face of grave human rights abuses. 
Forced displacement is also an important part of the repertoire of paramilitary 
human rights violations. Reinaldo Villalba was most vocal in explaining the connection 
between forced displacement and neoliberal private enterprise. He accused large 
landowners, agro industrial companies, and multinationals of being responsible for the 
extremely high levels of forced displacement in Colombia. CODHES, a respected rights 
organization specializing in the monitoring of the phenomenon, defines displacement as a 
situation in which communities and individuals are forced to flee their homes and towns 
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as a consequence of the violent actions of illegal armed groups and the actions or neglect 
of the state ("Salto Estratégico o Salto al Vacío?" 1). CODHES indicates that over 
5,200,000 persons in Colombia were forcibly displaced between January 1985 and June 
2011 ("De la seguridad a la prosperidad democrática en medio del conflicto" 23).  
Evidence suggests that paramilitary groups are the "primary force responsible for 
displacement" in Colombia (García-Godos and Lid 491). By underscoring the role of 
forced displacement to the modus operandi of paramilitary groups, key informants 
showed the concrete connections between the process of capital accumulation and the 
paramilitary phenomenon. Displacement is a type of accumulation by dispossession and a 
part of the process of creative destruction required for unbridled growth and productivity. 
By displacing through violence, paramilitaries "open up terrains for raw material 
extraction," a process essential to the capital growth that guides the logic of neoliberalism 
(Harvey, "The Right to the City" 24).  In Colombia, paramilitary displacement largely 
takes place in "areas of strategic economic...importance" including "fertile land" and 
"areas with valuable natural resources such as gold and other minerals, oil, or precious 
woods" (Hristov, Blood and Capital 76).  The geographical history of displacement in the 
country underscores the connections between paramilitary violence and the process of 
capital accumulation. 
In elaborating on the reasons behind forced displacement in Colombia, many 
interviewees mentioned specific economic enterprises and businesses that benefitted from 
the displacement of civilian populations carried out by paramilitary groups. Andreu, 
Villalba, Peña, and the anonymous fiscal interviewed in Medellín all specifically 
mentioned agroindustrial projects as ones traditionally implicated in paramilitary 
violence. One of the most notable examples is the cultivation and export of bananas. 
Historian Avi Chomsky explains how banana corporations in Colombia in the early to 
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mid-twentieth century relied on the "violent pressure and death threats" of paramilitaries 
for the "massive expulsion of peasants" necessary for the expansion of their land holdings 
(94). As the example shows, violence is an essential part of the capitalist logic, 
representing a type of primitive accumulation of the sort that Karl Marx describes in his 
work. The paramilitaries' role in capital accumulation from the start of the 20th century 
demonstrates that the larger strategy of capital accumulation has been a common thread 
of paramilitarism since its inception. In underscoring the connections between 
agroindustrial projects and the repertoire of paramilitary violence, informants once again 
put into question the dominant historical account of paramilitarism as a 
counterinsurgency effort. In highlighting paramilitaries' long-standing practice of 
protecting private business, they framed the phenomenon as part of a broader political 
project in defense of elite interests, one promoted explicitly by the Colombian state. 
Similar to the case of rights violations against trade unionists, the state 
involvement in forced displacement extends beyond the support of the economic system 
that paramilitarism defends. An example of massive forced displacement in the Pacific 
coast of Colombia, a strategic economic zone, shows the state's direct participation in 
human rights abuses. In 1997, army and paramilitary groups jointly carried out 
"Operation Genesis," a violent action that supposedly aimed at ridding the area of 
guerrilla groups (Oslender 756). Nonetheless, it is Afro-Colombian groups holding 
collective title to the valuable and resource-rich lands on the coast that suffered the 
consequence of the operation; the terror that military and paramilitary groups generated 
forced these groups to flee their homes (756).  Consequently, the state took control of the 
civilians' valuable and resource rich lands for development of capitalist projects (757). 
The example illustrates Villalba's point of paramilitarism as an "estrategia de 
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estado...para favorecer los grandes capitales." This example shows the direct complicity 
of the state in paramilitary defense of private interests. 
 The state's involvement in violent forced displacement also involves inaction. An 
unspoken policy of total impunity concerning cases of displacement is another 
demonstration of the state's complete complicity in the paramilitary project. In the 
aforementioned example, Afro-Colombian communities could not return to their lands; 
private enterprises specializing in highly productive monoculture projects took over in 
these areas (Oslender 760). As this particular example shows, the state's participation in 
violent processes of capital accumulation through forced displacement was threefold: 
through the promotion of the neoliberal regime, through a direct collaboration in the 
violent actions of paramilitaries, and through a complete impunity in the face of grave 
violations of the rights of Colombian citizens.  
INSTITUTIONALIZED PARAMILITARISM 
The state's collaboration and complicity in violent paramilitarism extends far 
beyond the aforementioned examples of forced displacement and violation of the rights 
of trade unionists. Federico Andreu called paramilitary violence a "política de estado." 
Reinaldo Villalba echoed Andreu in his allegations, saying that " las políticas de estado 
están dirigidas a la conformación y consolidación del paramilitarismo." The state's 
forceful embrace of neoliberal reforms is one example of the ways in which state policy 
foments paramilitarism. In implementing reforms that favor the current neoliberal 
strategy of capital accumulation, the state creates the conditions necessary for the 
expansion of private business and export-oriented industry. Fully profiting from 
neoliberal enterprise, in turn, necessitates the use of violence. The analyses of informants 
suggested that the state's participation far surpassed the support of the neoliberal project. 
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Interviewees explained that state involvement in paramilitarism is a far-reaching 
institutionalized practice in Colombia. 
In the offices of the Corporación Arcoiris in Bogotá, investigator Angélica Arias 
smiled cynically as I asked her to elaborate on the Colombian state's connection to 
paramilitarism. "Aquí no vas a encontrar muy buenas perspectivas," she warned. She 
explained her organization's important emphasis on making public "la inmensa 
implicación de sectores políticos en el paramilitarismo." The situation Arias described is 
the parapolítica scandal, one that revealed the connections between paramilitarism and 
political actors in the country. All fourteen interviewees highlighted these connections 
between the state and the paramilitary project.  In describing the phenomenon, most 
informants utilized language and examples that implied its systematic nature. María 
Victoria Fallon accused former President Alvaro Uribe Vélez of attempting to obscure 
the connections between public officials and paramilitary groups. In suggesting the 
participation of the former president of Colombia, Fallon framed the practice as one 
coming from the highest levels of the state, implying the immense scale of the 
government's involvement. Abilio Peña of the Comisión Intereclesial de Justicia y Paz 
echoed Fallon's sentiments, calling paramilitaries "hijos del estado." Peña underscored 
the long trajectory of these ties in using language that highlighted the intimate 
relationship between the government and paramilitarism. In doing so, he harked back to 
the legal creation of the groups in Colombia. Peña also spoke of paramilitary leader 
Salvatore Mancuso's own claims that 35% of the Colombian congress was involved in 
paramilitary activity.8 In underscoring the systematic political ties of paramilitary groups, 
                                                
8 Salvatore Mancuso was one of the most prominent and public leaders of the AUC. As part of the Justicia 
y Paz demobilization process, he was one of the paramilitaries who gave versiones libres or testimonies in 
which he confessed his crimes and revealed the modus operandi of paramilitary groups. The Justicia y Paz 
process will be addressed in Chapter 3. 
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informants framed state support as an essential, rather than incidental, part of the 
paramilitary project.  
In our interview in Bogotá, Carlos Espitia of the think tank Indepaz called the 
paramilitaries' "infiltración en las instituciones" a trademark of these groups. The fiscal 
interviewed in Medellín spoke of corruption in state agencies, saying that this corruption 
is the reason why " tierras aparecen adscritas a testaferros." The informant referred 
specifically to the actions of INCODER, the Colombian Institute for Rural Development, 
which, along with local government institutions, was complicit in forced displacement of 
populations in the Córdoba and Antioquia provinces ("Investigan a Incoder, Notarías, y 
Fondo Ganadero de Córdoba por Despojo"). The fiscal's comments make more specific 
the connections between paramilitary land grabbing and state support and promotion of 
capitalist accumulation. The involvement of entire institutions, such as INCODER, 
underscores the systematic and entrenched nature of the state/paramilitary connection.  
The fiscal's input is particularly valuable in understanding the state's 
institutionalized complicity in paramilitarism. Throughout our interview, she was 
especially adamant in emphasizing the systematic nature of corruption in Colombia and 
described her own personal experience with corrupt practices. She described a situation 
in which her supervisor attempted to persuade her to participate in illicit activity. When 
she refused, he transferred her to another office and replaced her with another more 
malleable judge. She defined her experience as one that is common in her institution. 
Because of her high ethical standards, she was a pariah in the Fiscalía and feared for her 
personal safety. Her insider knowledge of the state, her critical stance concerning the 
government, and her willingness to speak out despite serious threats to her safety gave 
particular credence to her remarks, which underscored the deeply-rooted connections 
between the state and paramilitarism. The fiscal's description of systematic practices of 
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corruption seems to reflect Jasmin Hristov's description of paramilitary "penetration" in 
the state (Blood and Capital 133). The fiscal's account does not truly reflect what she 
terms "corruption," which implies that the faults in the justice system are attributable to 
"a few bad apples" (133). Instead, her description of systematic collaboration depicts 
what Hristov labels an institutionalized "penetration" of paramilitarism in the justice 
system. The term "penetration" more accurately describes the entrenched nature of 
paramilitarism in the Colombian state. 
 The fiscal's testimony, as well as that of the other civil society representatives, 
differed significantly from the comments of the two other key informants from state 
organizations. Fabio Ruiz of the Presidency and Luis Alberto Bonilla of the 
Ombudsman's office limited their comments concerning state complicity to saying that 
there was connivance in "algunos sectores" of the state. These representatives only spoke 
of "a few bad apples" supporting paramilitarism. Their more reserved comments 
contrasted starkly with those of the fiscal, who assured me that support and complicity 
with paramilitarism was an institutionalized practice within the state. The representatives' 
more restrained comments could be attributed to their positions as visible public officials 
and a fear of the consequences of speaking out against the government. Given the fiscal's 
situation, this is a likely possibility. This silence on the part of the government and the 
serious consequences for state officials that criticize and expose the Colombian state's 
entrenched links to paramilitarism highlight the power and magnitude of the interests at 
stake in the paramilitary project. 
The discussion of the nature of the "new" armed groups in the interviews 
inevitably involved an analysis of the trajectory of paramilitarism in Colombia. By 
analyzing the political and economic structures that fuel paramilitary activity, key 
informants all contested the hegemonic discourse concerning historical paramilitarism, 
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debunking the unidimensional explanation of the phenomenon in terms of 
counterinsurgent ideology. Instead, informants' alternate conceptualizations underscored 
the complex and hybrid political and criminal nature of paramilitary groups, the 
connections between paramilitary human rights violations and the project of capital 
accumulation, and the state's long-standing complicity in the actions of paramilitaries.   
 41 
Chapter 3: 
"BACRIM" or "Paramilitares"? Understanding the "New" 
Phenomenon 
'SIN JUSTICIA Y SIN PAZ:' EVALUATING THE PEACE PROCESS 
During our interview, I asked Reinaldo Villalba to describe "Justicia y Paz," the 
landmark 2005 peace process in which the government of former President Alvaro Uribe 
led the negotiation of the demobilization of paramilitary groups. Villalba summarized his 
outlook on the paramilitary peace process by telling me his alternative name for it---"Sin 
Justicia y Sin Paz." He went on to explain the reasons for his negative analysis: 
Es que aquí no queremos que cojan al sicario, al patrón de diez sicarios, aquí son 
las estructuras y las cabezas políticas y económicas del paramilitarismo. Mientras 
tanto es falso lo de la voluntad política de persecución. Eso es lo esencial. Porque 
al final [capturar] un paramilitar raso que le entregan un revolver, un fusil para 
que mate gente pues no es el gran favor a la sociedad... El gran favor a la sociedad 
es eliminar la raíz del problema.  
Key informants' analysis of the trajectory of paramilitarism culminated in general 
agreement on the failure of the demobilization process and a broad consensus on the 
reasons for its shortcomings. The interviewees agreed on the Colombian government's 
failure to address the political and economic structures that fuel paramilitarism in the 
country. Most went as far as to say that the government was unwilling to address these 
structures because, in doing so, it would have exposed its own profound involvement 
with paramilitarism.  
In the Bogotá offices of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, Antonio Menéndez, head of the Impunity Section, told me of the office's 
skepticism concerning the legitimacy of the government's peace plan. Following a close 
observation of the process, he and his colleagues concluded that the process was not 
genuine and failed to dismantle the political and social structures underlying 
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paramilitarism. Cesar Molinares similarly cited a lack of "sinceridad" in the process, 
explaining that "nunca se desmontaron las estructuras económicas y políticas." Carlos 
Prieto echoed these attitudes concerning the continuity of the structural issues, saying 
"seguimos teniendo los mismos problemas." In speaking of the structural permanence, 
informants referred to the economic interests that represent immense sources of profit for 
these groups. Additionally, they pointed to the ongoing process of capital accumulation 
that supports the licit and illicit economic projects of paramilitaries. Despite these 
continuities, the Justice and Peace Law that guided the paramilitary demobilization shows 
the government's unwillingness to define paramilitarism in a way that highlights the 
crucial relevance of capital accumulation, government complicity, and human rights 
issues to the paramilitary project. In the final analysis, the Justice and Peace process 
adhered to the state-formed conceptualization of paramilitaries as counterinsurgent 
forces. Historian Jacobo Grajales interprets the Justice and Peace Law as one that 
definitively cemented "la visión del paramilitarismo como una forma de movilización 
política armada y contra-insurgente" (174). 
 Article 71 of the Justice and Peace Law illustrates this point. The section declares 
that guerrilla and paramilitary forces are guilty of sedition and that their crimes are to be 
judged similarly to those that fit under the category of rebellion (Ley 975 de 2005). In 
essence, Article 71 recognizes paramilitary groups as counterinsurgent political forces. 
As the key informants denounced and the historical evidence demonstrates, this 
counterinsurgent political nature does not accurately describe the motivations and modus 
operandi of paramilitary groups. In 2006, a Colombian Constitutional Court decision 
declared Article 71 unconstitutional (Grajales 176). However, the Court's decision was 
based on a procedural argument and not on the deeper substantive argument of whether 
paramilitary groups can be considered seditious (176). Furthermore, the decision was not 
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retroactive, meaning that it was not applicable to paramilitaries that demobilized prior to 
the Court's 2006 decision (176). A later Supreme Court decision challenged Article 71 
once again, arguing that processing paramilitary groups under the crime of sedition 
would amount to an acceptance that these groups' acts are altruistic and benefit the 
common good, in this way mocking victims' rights to truth and justice (177). As these 
court rulings argue, the law's substance and its effects favor a unidimensional political 
legal treatment of these paramilitary groups, thus ignoring the larger political and 
economic structures that fuel these armed actors. 
Article 10 of the Justice and Peace Law requires that groups demobilizing under 
the law must not have been organized for drug trafficking or illicit enrichment. If the law 
recognized the true hybrid nature of the groups, such a condition would make all 
paramilitaries ineligible to demobilize under the ruling. As the analysis of paramilitary 
history shows, narcotrafficking is a signature characteristic of these groups' activity. The 
trajectory of Salvatore Mancuso is a case in point. In an anonymous interview, a narcotics 
trafficker claimed that Mancuso made a 90 million dollar profit from the drug trade; he 
concluded by saying that "Mancuso es un capo" (qtd. in Camacho Guizado 52).  
Furthermore, analyses of the territorial zones of paramilitary control show a strong 
correlation between strategic zones of coca cultivation and paramilitary activity (36). 
This territorial correlation underscores the systematic nature of paramilitary participation 
in the drug trade, a fact not reflected in the language or provisions of the Justice and 
Peace Law.  
In speaking of one of the law's most notable structural deficiencies, Reinaldo 
Villalba called the Justice and Peace Law "la operación mas gigantesca de impunidad de 
la historia del país." He spoke of Article 29 of the law, which grants paramilitaries 
reduced prison sentences of between five to eight years, conditioned on whether they are 
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truthful in their confessions and on the gravity of the crimes to which they confess. 
Villalba went on to critique this fact, calling the reduced sentences "una quasi amnistía." 
In her analysis of the continuity of paramilitary violence, María Victoria Uribe, an 
anthropologist and expert on historical memory in Colombia, blames the continuity of 
paramilitary violence from the La Violencia period to the current era on  "a lack of 
solution to the original problem and partial amnesties leading to periods of war and 
civility on a single continuum" (6). As Uribe explains, amnesties for perpetrators are to 
blame for the repetition of violence. Even the actors I interviewed who were most closely 
aligned to the state, Luis Alberto Bonilla and Fabio Ruiz, critiqued Article 29.  Bonilla 
described the reduced prison sentences as "exiguas. . .frente a la gravedad de los delitos." 
Ruiz explained his disappointment in the government's demobilization process, citing the 
lenient prison sentences as one of the main structural problems of the law. These 
informants mentioned the amnesties as important factors that explain the continuity of 
paramilitarism. Similar to the narcotrafficking clause, interviewees believed that the 
amnesty clauses were illogical in the case of Colombian paramilitaries. While they are 
considered inapplicable to paramilitaries who are found guilty of grave human rights 
violations, evidence highlights the ways in which grave human rights violations such as 
forced disappearances, massacres, targeted assassinations, and massive forced 
displacement are, like narcotrafficking, systematic characteristics of the modus operandi 
of paramilitary groups.  
 Adding to the law's incompatibility with the nature of these armed groups, the 
conditions of the reduced sentencing that Article 29 delineates are extremely difficult to 
enforce. The fiscal in Medellín, who has participated in the sentencing of demobilized 
paramilitaries, described Justicia y Paz as a process of verification rather than 
investigation. Abilio Peña echoed the fiscal's observations. He explained that 
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paramilitaries "dicen lo que les conviene en un momento determinado y callan lo otro." 
The process is one in which the paramilitary is in control, deciding "qué confiesa y qué 
no, cómo lo hace, cómo matiza, relativiza, niega o justifica;" the judge is, in turn, reduced 
to a passive listener (Velásquez 148).  The structure and dynamics of the versiones libres, 
the hearings in which paramilitaries confess to their crimes in exchange for the benefits 
of the Justicia y Paz Law, favor paramilitaries and ultimately lead to impunity. Families 
of paramilitaries' victims are not allowed in the same room as the defendants. From a 
separate location, these families ask the paramilitary being tried for specific information 
about their disappeared loved ones. In the examples that the Colombian documentary 
Impunity depicts, the paramilitary's response is extremely vague. The individual 
mechanically explains that he does not know of the fate of the victim and, occasionally, 
refers to paramilitarism's supposed counterinsurgent ideology in explaining why the 
individual was disappeared or assassinated (Lozano). There are no complementary 
investigation methods in place to verify paramilitaries' declarations and confessions. By 
simply omitting their confessions of acts considered grave human rights violations or 
accusing their victims of belonging to guerrilla groups, paramilitaries can easily qualify 
for the reduced sentences under Article 29. The lack of accountability methods and the 
structural deficiencies of the law suggest the government's unwillingness to truly 
dismount paramilitarism. These lax conditions and provisions seem to support the view 
that the process amounted to a legalization of paramilitarism, in which these actors went 
relatively unpunished and gained access to various benefits for demobilizing (Velásquez 
140).  
In addition to its structural deficiencies, the law's extent was extremely 
unimpressive. Federico Andreu explained that " la inmensa mayoría...de los paras no 
están procesados porque no están identificados." Carlos Prieto's negative analysis of the 
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process centered on the fact that the justice system has sentenced only a handful out of 
approximately 4,000 paramilitaries that are being processed under the transitional justice 
law. A report from the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia specified that 
courts have only indicted and sentenced fourteen out of the thousands of possible 
applicants (Informe Anual de la Alta Comisionada 13). María Victoria Fallon pointed out 
that these 4,000 represent a small percentage of the more than 30,000 paramilitaries in 
Colombia. The government granted de facto amnesties to 28,000 of these paramilitaries 
through Decree 128 of 2003, under Law 782 of 2002 (Colombia: La Metáfora 341). 
While grave violations of human rights were characteristic of these groups, the state 
automatically pardoned an overwhelming majority of paramilitaries without more in 
depth investigations into their modus operandi and crimes. During the demobilization 
process, "the combatants registered their names, their level of involvement in 
the organization and whether they had violated human rights or humanitarian law." 
(García-Godos and Lid 504). Testament to the weak investigative measures that 
characterized the Justice and Peace process is the fact that "these combatants were given 
immunity in line with Decree 128 of 2003" if "they did not admit to any crimes and had 
no pending cases against them in the judicial system" (504). As the fiscal emphasized, 
paramilitaries are in control of what they confess and what they conceal, without any 
thorough process of accountability. Such deficiencies in the administration of justice 
ultimately led to widespread impunity for paramilitary groups. 
The informants' outlook on the process went beyond a critique of the law's 
provisions; they also assessed the law based on its exclusions and omissions. These 
critiques fully reflected informants' alternate interpretations of the paramilitary 
phenomenon. In explaining the reasons for the law's failure in terms of dismantling 
paramilitarism, Villalba noted that the peace process did not clearly establish and 
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prosecute the "empresarios, ganaderos, agricultores, y palmicultores que colaboraron" 
with paramilitaries. While paramilitaries revealed much of this complicity through their 
confessions in the context of the Justice and Peace process, there was no systematic 
process for taking judicial action against these actors. Failing to address and dismantle 
the connections between powerful elites and paramilitaries amounted to an ultimate 
failure to recognize the important role of the state-supported project of capitalist 
accumulation in systematically fueling the paramilitary phenomenon.  
Informants went on to critique the lack of investigation of state responsibility in 
the actions of paramilitary groups.  Villalba denounced the "ausencia de investigación 
frente a militares, políticos, y autoridades administrativas que...en el marco de Justicia y 
Paz los paramilitares han dicho que ellos les colaboraron y fueron cómplices de crímenes 
de lesa humanidad." The very definition of human rights violation implies the complicity 
of the state (Godoy 621). As the previously mentioned examples of forced displacement 
and violence against trade unionism illustrate, the state has been directly involved in 
human rights violations through action, complete neglect of victims, and its aggressive 
promotion of a notoriously violent economic system. Paramilitaries' confessions in the 
context of the transitional justice program were essential in exposing the systematic ties 
between the state and paramilitary groups. It is in the context of the demobilization that 
Salvatore Mancuso revealed paramilitarism's connections to politicians, as Abilio Peña 
mentioned. Nonetheless, the Justice and Peace law does not address these connections 
nor attempt to dismantle them. As Cesar Molinares stated, "no se dijo nada sobre los 
crímenes de sistema." Molinares' comment harks back to a recurring theme in informants' 
analysis of the paramilitary phenomenon. The state is not merely involved in paramilitary 
activity, but paramilitarism is a "para-state project," as the fiscal called it. Mancuso's 
declaration that paramilitary groups controlled 35% of congress is a testament to the 
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systematic nature of the state's complicity in paramilitary activity. Law 975 contained no 
provisions for the investigation and prosecution of state actors with links to paramilitary 
groups. Article 2 of Decree 1290, one that delineates certain provisions related to Law 
975, declares that the law's definition of victim does not include victims of state 
violations of human rights (Colombia: La Metáfora 316). While the government has 
prosecuted some politicians and state representatives individually, it has yet to establish a 
method for carrying out an overarching investigation of state involvement in 
paramilitarism. A comprehensive investigation is required, given the institutionalized 
nature of state complicity in paramilitary activity. As Abilio Peña stated, "lo que hace lo 
paramilitar es justo su vínculo con las unidades militares." Through his assertion, Peña 
suggested the fundamental nature of the state/paramilitary connection.  
Drawing upon her own personal experience witnessing the penetration of 
paramilitarism into her institution, the fiscal in Medellín called for a strengthening of 
institutions through the "neutralización de los corruptos." She designated this as one of 
the necessary steps for a true demobilization of paramilitarism. On a similar note, 
Federico Andreu called for a "depuración del estado en administración pública y en 
política." He went to explain that such a cleansing of corrupt institutions had to be a 
comprehensive and broad policy, given the systematic nature of state involvement in 
paramilitarism. Villalba explained how the historical penetration of paramilitarism in the 
state manifested itself even in the law's procedures and logistics. He specifically 
mentioned the current legal proceedings against Luis Carlos Restrepo, the former 
Commissioner for Peace in charge of the paramilitary demobilizations. Restrepo is 
accused of knowingly organizing the false demobilization of a FARC guerrilla bloc. 
According to Villalba, Restrepo's history makes valid the questioning of the legitimacy of 
the paramilitary demobilizations that he carried out. A report co-written by Villalba's 
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organization further suggests the government's corrupt practices within the 
demobilization process itself. The report echoes Peña's comment about the Colombian 
congress' deep involvement with paramilitarism. As the Colectivo and other 
organizations point out, it is this same congress that approved the Justice and Peace law 
(Sin Justicia y Sin Paz 25). This fact hints at the idea that paramilitarism and its interests 
were well represented in the design and approval of the law. In short, the state's 
complicity in paramilitary activity is not merely a distant historical fact, but permeated 
even the demobilization process, underscoring the immense degree and extent of 
state/paramilitary connivance and putting into question the legitimacy of the disbandment 
of paramilitarism. 
GUARANTEEING IMPUNITY 
For many informants, the most solid evidence of the government's refusal to truly 
dismantle paramilitarism is the 2008 extradition of important paramilitary leaders to the 
United States to be tried for the crime of narcotrafficking (Colombia: La Metáfora 299). 
Breaking with the official definition of paramilitarism as a counterinsurgent political 
project, the government seemed to implicitly recognize the criminal aspect of 
paramilitary groups by ordering their extradition. However, Reinaldo Villalba assured me 
that establishing the paramilitary connection to organized crime was not the motive 
behind the paramilitary extradition. Instead, Villalba explained that the extradition 
"obedeció a un afán de acallar a quienes algo querían decir sobre la verdad del 
paramilitarismo y su desarrollo y los beneficiarios de este país de la existencia de esas 
estructuras." Villalba once again stressed the powerful beneficiaries of paramilitarism, 
which included state actors. Informants suggested that the extradition was an attempt to 
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prevent the revelation of compromising links between the state and the paramilitary 
project.  
In the months preceding the extradition, important paramilitary leaders, including 
Salvatore Mancuso and Ever Veloza (known by his alias of HH), began revealing the 
links between politicians and the paramilitary phenomenon. Most of the politicians they 
denounced belonged to the coalition of political parties that supported then president 
Alvaro Uribe (Lozano). Paramilitarism's connections to the executive branch became 
clearer when paramilitary leaders publicized Senator Mario Uribe Escobar's complicity in 
paramilitarism; Uribe Escobar was a firm supporter of Alvaro Uribe and was also the 
president's cousin. Instead of turning himself over to authorities, Mario Uribe took refuge 
at the Costa Rican embassy in Bogotá. Many observers interpreted Mario Uribe's actions 
as self-incriminating; in attempting to evade capture, he seemed to admit to his guilt 
(Lozano). In May of 2008, shortly after these important revelations of political 
involvement in paramilitarism, president Alvaro Uribe made the sudden decision to 
extradite fourteen top paramilitary leaders to the United States to be tried for crimes 
related to narcotrafficking. In his justification for the extradition, Alvaro Uribe cited these 
leaders' lack of cooperation in the Justice and Peace process (Lozano). 
 However, the extradition coincided with the height of paramilitaries' revelations 
of state involvement in paramilitary activity, particularly the parapolítica scandal. As 
Luis Alberto Bonilla stated, these extradited paramilitaries "tenían información 
valiosísima sobre todo referente a las estructuras políticas, a los políticos, a los 
industriales, y a gente llamada, entre comillas, 'de bien' que apoyaron y contribuyeron a 
las acciones de las fuerzas de autodefensas." Extraditing top-ranking paramilitaries with 
compromising information represented the Colombian state's attempt to detract attention 
from the policies and direct state complicity that fomented paramilitarism. According to 
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Jacobo Grajales, the "criminalización del paramilitarismo" (189) allowed the Colombian 
government to "limpiar su imagen" and "posicionarse como el arquitecto del 
desmantelamiento del paramilitarismo." (190). By underscoring the criminal nature of 
paramilitary groups, the government concealed their multi-dimensional nature, obscuring 
their important historical connections to the state and to the violent process of capitalist 
expansion that the state promotes and supports. 
While the May 2008 extradition silenced the denunciations of important 
paramilitary leaders, the action did not include Ever Veloza, who continued to participate 
and give legal testimony that compromised important political and economic sectors in 
Colombia. He revealed Carlos Castaño's frequent reunions with political leaders and 
businessmen. He went on to explain that paramilitaries "no llegábamos a las regiones por 
azar," but instead entered regions of strategic economic importance with the support of 
state actors and private business (Lozano). Seemingly reacting to the paramilitary leader's 
important revelations, the Uribe administration extradited him to the United States in 
March of 2009 (Lozano). The Supreme Court of Colombia completely opposed the 
extradition, citing the need to prioritize victims' rights and the principle of non-repetition. 
The Court argued that, according to the Colombian Constitution, the state has a greater 
responsibility to its citizens than to foreign governments. The rights of victims of grave 
human rights violations had to be prioritized over the prosecution of the less grave crime 
of narcotrafficking, for which the United States sought the extradition of Veloza and the 
other paramilitary leaders (Colombia: La Metáfora 280). The extradition was the state's 
attempt at impeding the development of an accurate historical memory concerning the 
true motivations and modus operandi of paramilitarism. The extradition was contrary to 
the principle of non-repetition of the grave human rights violations against civilians that 
paramilitaries perpetrated. The Inter-American Court denounced this fact, saying that "la 
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extradición de estos paramilitares está reproduciendo condiciones de impunidad, lo que 
propicia la repetición crónica de las violaciones de derechos humanos"  (qtd. in 
Colombia: La Metáfora 311).  
Juan Diego Restrepo's analysis summarized the informants' outlook on the 
process. He told me that "Justicia y Paz no ha pasado."  Restrepo argued that the weak 
process, with its lax provisions and generous amnesties, virtually nonexistent verification 
and investigation measures, and inaccurate definition and conceptualization of 
paramilitarism, did not give paramilitary groups any compelling reasons to demobilize 
and leave their valuable territories and lucrative forms of capital accumulation. As 
informants argued, the process parted from a definition of paramilitarism that completely 
denied the important economic motivations of the phenomenon and the state's 
sponsorship of the process of capital accumulation that encourages such economic 
pursuits. Even more grave is the fact that the process did not address the state's important 
implications in paramilitarism. For this reason, the inferior results of the Justice and 
Peace process are unsurprising. As Jasmin Hristov explains, "the very system responsible 
for bringing justice is itself penetrated by narco-paramilitary power" (Blood and Capital 
175). This impunity for the crimes and human rights violations of the Colombian state 
allows for the continuation of the violence that characterized paramilitary activity. As the 
case of paramilitarism shows, the state is a fundamental culprit in the prolongation of the 
decades-long armed conflict in Colombia. 
THE 'POST-DEMOBILIZATION' ERA 
In a May 2007 speech, former President Alvaro Uribe “ordered the police to no 
longer speak of paramilitarism” (Hristov, "Self Defense Forces, Warlords, or Criminal 
Gangs?" 20). The removal of the term from the official discourse symbolized a complete 
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break with the past. If paramilitarism no longer existed, then human rights violations in 
Colombia, committed primarily by paramilitary groups, were no longer a significant 
issue. The president's statement also suggested that the state had moved past a dark era of 
direct and indirect involvement in illicit activity and egregious violations of human 
rights. In a different speech the same year, Uribe announced the "new" challenge to 
Colombia's security: 
Nos espera una tarea: liberar a los compatriotas... de una nueva organización 
armada que se llama “la ONG”, y de “los rastrojos”. No hablemos de esas bandas 
como fenómeno paramilitar subsistente, sino como fenómeno terrorista y 
narcotraficante que quiere maltratar al pueblo colombiano (Uribe Vélez). 
This statement referred to what the former president termed Bandas Criminales 
Emergentes al Servicio del Narcotráfico (Emerging Criminal Gangs Serving the 
Narcotrafficking Business). Known by the acronym of BACRIM, the groups' emergence 
coincided with the time of paramilitary demobilization, one which the government 
termed "post conflict," in another attempt to distance itself from a dark past (Vargas 215). 
In the speech, Uribe labeled these "new" groups "terrorists," inserting them into the 
international context of the United States' "War on Terror." Through the use of this 
language, Uribe disassociated the Colombian state from the actions of these groups and 
gained favor with its greatest international ally. Uribe also emphasized the uniquely 
criminal nature of these "new" groups. He constructed them in complete opposition to 
paramilitarism. By doing so, he implicitly reinforced the counterinsurgent political 
ideology that was the official characterization of paramilitary groups, underscored the 
success of his paramilitary demobilization, and forcefully asserted the complete 
separation of the state from the actions of these armed groups. 
In July of 2010, shortly before the end of Alvaro Uribe's second term in office, the 
Colombian government released a decree in which it defined what it termed "BACRIM" 
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more specifically; the decree described the "BACRIM" as armed groups that converge in 
strategic zones of narcotics trafficking and engage solely in criminal activity, without any 
sort of political ideology (Decreto Número 2374 de 2010, emphasis added). In formally 
defining these groups in opposition to paramilitaries, Uribe proclaimed the success of the 
paramilitary demobilization, symbolically marking the triumph of his mandate and 
downplaying the scandal of government involvement in paramilitarism that tainted his 
administration. Following this official conceptualization, these groups are also defined as 
“small emerging criminal organizations” that engage in drug trafficking combined with 
extortion; many emphasize that these activities demonstrate that they cannot be “self-
defense groups” (Hristov, “Self-Defense Forces, Warlords, or Criminal Gangs?” 20). 
Others support the government's labeling by describing the BACRIM as lacking "the 
central structure and ideological base of” paramilitaries (Porch and Rasmussen 530). The 
state portrays the BACRIM in complete opposition to paramilitarism, on a false 
dichotomy between common and political crime. In emphasizing that their involvement 
in narcotrafficking and supposed lack of ideology means that they cannot be self-defense 
forces, the state implies that paramilitaries were just the opposite---groups with purely 
counterinsurgent political motivations that were not involved in acts of organized crime.   
 Directly challenging the official state discourse, key informants all highlighted 
the strong connections between the "new" armed groups, known officially as "BACRIM," 
and the paramilitary phenomenon. The anonymous fiscal, Villalba, Andreu, Peña, and 
Fallon all utilized the term paramilitary to refer to these "new" armed groups. In this way, 
the actors indicated the full continuity of the phenomenon and underscored the complete 
failure of the demobilization process. Teófilo Vásquez of CINEP described these groups 
as "el rearme del paramilitarismo." He went on to say that, while the state dismounted the 
militarized aspect of paramilitarism, the process was ineffective in dismantling 
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paramilitarism structurally. Other actors seemed to follow Vásquez' idea of a new stage 
or "rearme" of paramilitary activity. Arias called these groups "neoparamilitares." Espitia 
told me that Indepaz labels them "narcoparamilitares," highlighting these groups' stronger 
links to narcotrafficking, while maintaining that they are a continuity of the paramilitary 
phenomenon. Also marking the continuity with paramilitarism, Carlos Prieto of FIP 
labeled them "paramilitares de tercera generación."  Antonio Menéndez of the Impunity 
Section of the UN High Commissioner's Colombia Office described these groups as 
direct heirs of paramilitarism.  
The media's discourse was significantly less challenging of the state discourse on 
"new" armed groups. While Restrepo was extremely critical in his personal analysis of 
the state position and vocal in describing the historically hybrid nature of paramilitary 
groups, he explained that he usually calls these groups BACRIM in his articles. While he 
sometimes labels them "grupos derivados de las AUC," he noted that the editing process 
is extremely limiting. He explained that reporters must passively accept the institutional 
discourse; when they attempt to problematize the labeling process, strict deadlines and 
the journalistic principle of simply reporting "the facts" limit a more thorough analysis. 
Molinares cited journalistic objectivity and a refusal to become involved in politics as his 
reasons for calling the "new" armed groups by the individual names of their discrete 
blocs. Molinares, however, was also clear in critiquing the state's conceptualization of 
both the paramilitary phenomenon and "new" armed groups. While both journalists held 
powerful opinions that echoed civil society organizations' analyses, their positions as 
reporters limited their more open contestation of the state discourse. Their comments 
illustrate the limits of the process of labeling in explaining the phenomenon of "new" 
armed groups and the important role of contextualization in accurately conceptualizing 
these groups. The media's overall adherence to the official discourse underscores the 
 56 
dominance of the state in influencing and shaping dominant societal attitudes and 
perceptions of reality. 
In general, the media in Colombia is largely subjected to the state's official 
position. Despite the limitations of the profession that both Restrepo and Molinares cite, 
they seem to have comparatively more freedom to problematize the state discourse than 
other journalists representing mainstream news sources.  This is because the Fundación 
Ideas para la Paz and the Open Society Foundations sponsor Verdad Abierta, the 
publication that Restrepo and Molinares represent.9  However, this is not applicable to the 
most visible media outlets. In Colombia, it is a powerful and rich minority that controls 
the mainstream media. In March of 2012, the richest man in the country, Luis Carlos 
Sarmiento, acquired the most important newspaper in the country, El Tiempo. He is also 
the owner of El Colombiano, another important newspaper with high readership in the 
Antioquia department. Political analyst María Elvira Samper questions whether a 
newspaper owned by an individual with high stakes in some of the most important banks 
in the country and with significant investments in agroindustry, the energy sector, and 
construction can truly be neutral in its reporting and analysis of events related to these 
topics ("Sarmiento compra El Tiempo").  
Given Sarmiento's condition as a stakeholder in capital accumulation and his 
profit from projects promoted by neoliberal policy, it is unsurprising that the newspaper's 
reporting of the paramilitary phenomenon and of "new" armed groups does not 
significantly problematize the historical trajectory of paramilitarism or expose the true 
motives underlying "new" armed groups. The powerful Santos family also has partial 
                                                
9 According to its mission statement, the Open Society Foundation aims "to strengthen the rule of law; 
respect for human rights, minorities, and a diversity of opinions; democratically elected governments; and a 
civil society that helps keep government power in check." ("Mission and Values," emphasis added).  
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ownership of this newspaper. This is the extended family of current President Juan 
Manuel Santos ("Sarmiento compra El Tiempo"). Santos was former President Uribe's 
defense minister during his second term in office and he currently maintains the discourse 
of "BACRIM" that the former president introduced after the paramilitary demobilization. 
As the example of these news sources shows, important political and economic actors 
actively control the official discourse and the deliberate silences of the media in 
Colombia, thus shaping the dominant societal perceptions and suppressing crucial 
information concerning the state and elite actors' vested involvement and complicity in 
violent paramilitarism. 
 The two state representatives interviewed were wary of calling these "new" 
armed groups by any name other than the official one of "BACRIM." When I pressed 
him on the issue, Luis Alberto Bonilla told me that the Ombudsman's office follows "el 
término de la ley" in naming these groups. He was emphatic, however, in saying that "los 
paramilitares siguen actuando y siguen generando víctimas." He drew a sharp distinction 
between the official view of the Ombudsman's office and his own analysis of the 
phenomenon. He felt the need to speak personally, rather than institutionally, in order to 
candidly address the continuity of the paramilitary phenomenon. For similar reasons, 
Fabio Ruiz espoused the government's label of "BACRIM" in his official capacity. 
Nonetheless, he spoke insistently about the continuity of the paramilitary phenomenon.  
Like Bonilla, he broke from his state position, speaking as a sociologist rather than a 
public official when contradicting the state's discourse. While some of the informants 
spoke more candidly than others, all emphasized the continuity of the paramilitary 
phenomenon after the 2005 demobilization. They cited current evidence of the factors 
that characterize paramilitary activity, particularly a modus operandi geared towards 
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profitmaking, a repertoire of human rights violations that obeys the logic of capital 
accumulation, and the complicity of the state in this action. 
Informants began explaining paramilitary continuity by emphasizing the 
involvement of many paramilitaries in "new" armed groups. Teófilo Vásquez explained 
that "mandos medios que nunca se desmovilizaron" are the commanders of these groups. 
Molinares echoed Vásquez, saying that the groups are led by "los jefes medios que no se 
desmovilizaron." In an evaluation of one of the discrete blocs of these "new" armed 
groups, known as " Los Urabeños," Indepaz traces the history of its inception. Following 
the official demobilization of the paramilitary group Bloque Elmer Cardenas in 2006, 
commanded by Fredy Rendón Herrera, the leader's brother Daniel Rendón Herrera 
assumed leadership of the organization (Espitia 61).  Currently, it is Daniel Antonio 
Usuaga that heads the organization. Usuaga, known by his alias of Otoniel, was a 
member of the AUC and a close ally of one of the AUC's founders, Vicente Castaño 
("¿Quién es alias Otoniel?'").  
Informants also underscored the fact that the zones in which these groups act are 
historical paramilitary strongholds. In highlighting this information, they suggested the 
similarity in the economic motives that fuel both groups. Juan Diego Restrepo explained 
that the expansion of these "new" armed groups occurred "sobre la base de las viejas 
estructuras y territorios que [los paramilitares] dejaron afines." In emphasizing the 
strategic territorial control of these groups, Restrepo connected them to a long trajectory 
of paramilitarism, which from its inception during the Violencia period aimed at 
controlling important spaces for the benefit of elite economic actors.  The map in Figure 
1, created by the independent Colombian news source "La Silla Vacía," illustrates the 
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convergence between 
AUC strongholds and 
the territories that these 
"new" armed groups 
control (Diaz 1).10 
The particular 
territorial presence of 
these "new" armed 
actors reveals specific 
information about their 
particular economic 
pursuits and the 
complicity of private 
business actors in these 
groups' activities. An 
Indepaz report warns 
that these actors exert 
influence in areas where "se proyecta la explotación de recursos mineros a gran escala 
por empresas transnacionales como la AngloGold Ashanti" (González-Perafán 43). Such 
strategic territorial presence suggests the implication of these armed groups in the process 
of accumulation of capital, a fact that alerts to their continued adherence to the creed of 
profitmaking that characterized the paramilitary project. Furthermore, the report suggests 
                                                
10 La Silla Vacía is an important independent news source in Colombia specializing in investigative 
reporting on Colombian politics. In its website, the organization differentiates itself from mainstream news 
sources, saying: "La diferencia entre la Silla Vacía y los otros medios en los que he trabajado es que 
podemos contar todo lo que sabemos porque no tenemos amigos poderosos, ni intereses económicos que 
podamos afectar con nuestras historias" (Leon). 
Figure 1: Paramilitary and BACRIM Territories  
Orange- Municipalities affected by paramilitaries 2003-2006 
Green- Areas Affected by Forced Displacement in 2010 
Green Circles- Number of BACRIM operating in the department 
Source- (Diaz 1) 
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the sustained involvement of private businesses in the "new" phenomenon. The territorial 
presence of these groups also includes zones of strategic coca cultivation or exportation. 
As Figure 1 indicates, many of the areas of "new" armed group presence are zones with 
exits to the Pacific Ocean and Caribbean Sea, important ports for the export of narcotics. 
A report by the Corporación Arcoiris indicates that "la mayoría de los departamentos y 
municipios comprometidos en este tema [de las BACRIM] son corredores de narcotráfico 
o sencillamente zonas de interés dados los recursos naturales, bienes en materia de 
minerales y de madera con variedad de ríos y salidas al mar" (Arias 14).  The strategic 
locations of these groups, which closely mirror the geographic presence of demobilized 
AUC paramilitaries, indicate the licit and illicit economic pursuits that motivate these 
groups' actions and their insertion into the process of capital accumulation. 
The particular geographical presence of these "new" armed groups also reveals 
information about their links to the state apparatus. According to Indepaz, many of the 
zones of paramilitary presence are the same ones in which the government is carrying out 
its Plan of Territorial Consolidation ("Zonas de Consolidación y Grupos Armados" 33). 
This plan aims to establish state presence in areas where illegal armed groups have 
traditionally dominated; this implies primarily an increased incursion of military or police 
forces in these zones (Isacson 5). One of the most important aims of the plan is to 
transform conflict-ridden territories into areas that support economic growth and 
encourage international investment (Reporte Ejecutivo: Plan Nacional de Consolidación 
4). In essence, the plan intends to stimulate neoliberal growth within these conflict zones, 
a venture that is highly problematic given the historical connections between 
paramilitarism and the project of capital accumulation. Indepaz indicates that 40 out of 
the 54 municipalities chosen for the implementation of the plan of territorial 
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consolidation are also zones of violence and illicit activity of "new" armed groups 
("Zonas de Consolidación y Grupos Armados" 33).  
Indepaz gives the specific example of the Montes de María region in the 
northwestern part of Colombia, located in the Bolivar and Sucre departments.  While the 
think tank warns of the violent actions of "new" armed groups in this area, the Colombian 
government deemed the zone ready for increased rural agricultural development and 
international investment ("Zonas de Consolidación y Grupos Armados" 33). The 
correlation between "new" armed group violence and aggressive neoliberalization does 
not seem coincidental, given the proven links between neoliberal policies and 
paramilitary violence. Similar to the paramilitary era, the government continues to 
prioritize the economic endeavors of elite actors over the rights of civilians. The state's 
assertion that the Montes de María region is "safe" and ready for international 
investment, a statement contrary to evidence, shows the state's continued indifference in 
the face of human rights violations. In short, the example suggests the government's 
continued responsibility for the violations committed by these armed groups in the 
supposedly "post-demobilization" era. 
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: A REPETITION OF HISTORY 
In terms of human rights, informants all underscored the correlation between 
human rights violations of "new" groups and the modus operandi of paramilitaries. 
Federico Andreu was emphatic in saying that these groups commit the same crimes and 
human rights violations as paramilitaries. Cesar Molinares told me that these groups are 
not simply delinquents, but instead aim to control strategic territories by the use of 
violence.  These "new" armed groups exert the same social control as paramilitaries, 
targeting anyone who gets in the way of their interests. Teófilo Vásquez denounced the 
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assassination of land restitution leaders as one of the characteristic human rights 
violations that these armed groups commit. The fiscal, Angélica Arias, and Carlos Espitia 
all echoed Vásquez in mentioning these specific targeted assassinations as characteristic 
of the "new" armed groups.  Article 8 of the Justice and Peace law asserts victims' rights 
to reparations, including the restitution of their lands (Ley 975 del 2005).  Nonetheless, 
illegal armed groups assassinated 66 land restitution leaders between 2005 and 2011 
(Romero 115). More than half of these targeted assassinations took place in the 
Caribbean coast region, which--as Figure 1 illustrates-- is a traditional zone of 
paramilitary activity that is currently under the control of "new" armed groups (114). 
These land leaders, much like human rights defenders and other social groups during the 
paramilitary era, denounce the violent actions of these groups and organize to assert 
victims' rights.  
Carlos Espitia included these land leaders as part of a longer list of social 
organizations that these "new" armed groups target. This deliberate attack of social 
organizations is in line with the paramilitary strategy of persecuting social movements, 
human rights workers, or civilian organizations that get in the way of these groups' 
economic interests.  As part of this modus operandi of violence against social 
organizations, Espitia mentioned the continued practice of targeting labor unionists. The 
International Trade Union Confederation reports "480 violations of trade unionists’ rights 
to life, freedom, and physical integrity in Colombia" in 2011 (Colombia 2012). Thirty-
five unionists were assassinated in 2011, giving Colombia the notorious distinction of 
being the most dangerous place in the world to be a trade unionist.  An overwhelming 
majority of the perpetrators of these violations are unknown, suggesting the widespread 
impunity for these violations and the state's inaction in terms of these violations. Out of 
those remaining, approximately 73% (104 total) of the violations "were perpetrated by 
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paramilitaries" (Colombia 2012). Interestingly, the International Trade Union 
Confederation maintains the term "paramilitary." In doing so, they suggest the failure of 
the demobilization process, and underscore the severity of the human rights violations 
that these groups commit. Violations against trade unionists are particularly indicative of 
the lack of success of the demobilization, given that they are a trademark violation 
committed by paramilitary groups in defense of the economic logic of neoliberalism and 
capital accumulation. The continued issue of violence against trade unionists underscores 
the persistent relevance of the economic project that paramilitarism promotes and 
defends. 
Even more indicative of the continuity of paramilitary structures is the 
contemporary relevance of forced displacement to the actions of these armed groups. 
Andreu, Villalba, Peña, and the fiscal in Medellín all specifically mentioned 
agroindustrial projects, specifically the cultivation of African oil palm, as the business 
enterprises deeply implicated in paramilitary violence in the post-demobilization era.  
Indeed, the oil palm industry is an important part of the Colombian economy. In 2007, 
the country became the fifth largest producer of oil palm in the world and the largest 
producer of the crop in the hemisphere (Seeboldt and Salinas 18). Nonetheless, it is a 
systematic process of "accumulation by dispossession" that foments the growth and 
success of the oil palm industry. As the aforementioned example of oil palm production 
in the Pacific coast illustrates, this agricultural project has important historical 
connections to paramilitarism.  During the paramilitary era, leader Vicente Castaño allied 
himself with oil palm empresarios to forcibly displace Afro-Colombian populations and 
make room for lucrative agricultural expansion (Camacho Guizado 37). Correlating with 
the most recent expansion of the oil palm business was an increase in the occurrence of 
forced displacement in the country.  From 2007 to 2008, there was a 25% increase in 
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forced displacement, even though this period came after the demobilization of the actors 
that perpetrated most of the human rights violations in the country (Hristov, "Legalizing 
the Illegal" 13). The UN High Commissioner for Refugees warns that nearly 1400 
displaced persons have been assassinated since 2007 (Romero 114). She alerts of the 
state's complicity in these murders, saying that out of every 200 denunciations of threats 
against displaced persons, the justice system only investigates one (114). This case is 
illustrative of Godoy's point; the state violates civilians' rights because of its inaction in 
the face of grave violations of human rights (621). The state permits the repetition of 
forced displacement through its policy of impunity. 
 Such a policy stems from the vested interests at stake that promote the endurance 
of the paramilitary phenomenon. According to sociologist Ricardo Vargas, one of most 
important reasons behind the failure of peace agreements is the "continued availability of 
rich natural resources" (215). As evidence demonstrates, gaining or maintaining control 
of such valuable natural resources implicates the violent actions of "new" armed groups. 
Specific cases of targeted assassinations and forced displacement in the fertile and bio 
diverse Chocó region within the context of the expanding oil palm industry underscore 
the links between control of valuable territory, the neoliberal project, and human rights 
violations committed by "new" armed groups. In the northwestern region of Chocó, 110 
people have been killed or disappeared since the 1990s. These individuals were murdered 
for their efforts to reclaim the land from which paramilitaries forcibly displaced them in 
order to make way for oil palm production (Seeboldt and Salinas 24). In December of 
2009, the Ombudsman's office denounced the presence of two "new" armed groups, the 
"Aguilas Negras" and the "Urabeños," in the fertile Curvaradó and Jiguamiandó regions 
of Chocó (Curbaradó y Jiguamiandó 3). Land restitution leaders in these regions have 
been victims of targeted assassinations in the last few years. These murders serve the 
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purpose of creating terror, forcing entire populations to flee from homes and abandon 
their valuable and resource-rich lands (Seeboldt and Salinas 25). The “need to find 
profitable terrains for capital-surplus production and absorption” shapes the project of 
capital accumulation, superseding the rights of communities to their land (Harvey, “The 
Right to the City” 24). In this case, oil palm corporations’ goal is to acquire valuable land 
at extremely low prices in order to expand their production capacity (Seeboldt and 
Salinas 25). Utilizing violence and fear to induce forced displacement represents an 
effective means to achieving this goal. The replication of the practices of paramilitaries in 
the Chocó region indicates the endurance of the paramilitary phenomenon and the 
continued complicity of private business and the capital accumulation process in fueling 
the armed conflict. 
THE STATE'S COMPLICITY 
Carlos Espitia criticized the policies and actions of current president Juan Manuel 
Santos. He explained that, while the president discursively highlights his intentions to 
restitute lands to victims of forced displacement, he endorses "la locomotora agraria, 
donde se piensa en megaproyectos, inversión extranjera, [y] el latifundismo." The 
monoculture project of oil palm cultivation, which involves the violent actions of these 
"new" groups, is a part of this state-sponsored project of neoliberalism.11 Espitia 
suggested that the historical precedence shows how the support of such economic 
projects is contrary to victims' rights. Espitia explained that the promotion of such 
projects and policies implied the state's tacit support for "new" armed groups. The state's 
                                                
11 The cultivation of oil palm is one of the government's projects of alternative development to combat the 
cultivation of illicit crops for the drug trade, particularly coca. Despite the history of violence 
accompanying monoculture projects such as oil palm cultivation, this crop substitution has become an 
important part of the US-funded Plan Colombia (Seeboldt and Salinas 22). 
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continued support for practices that historically necessitated paramilitary violence further 
indicates the persistent relevance of paramilitarism in Colombia. 
When I asked Juan Diego Restrepo whether "new" armed groups had any links 
with the state--particularly the police or the armed forces--he laughed as he said "Claro. 
Por eso es que no hablan ni contigo ni conmigo!" I had just mentioned the fact it had 
been nearly impossible for me to establish contact with state agencies, particularly the 
police. I sought to interview a police representative because this is the state agency 
designated to confront these "new" armed groups, in accordance with the government's 
classification of these groups as actors of organized crime. Some police representatives 
did not respond to my email or phone requests, while others claimed that they were not 
familiar enough with the phenomenon of "new" armed groups to speak about it with me. 
In Medellín, a sergeant in the SIJIN, the investigative unit of the police, even went as far 
as telling me that these "new" armed groups ("BACRIM," as he called them) were not 
present in the city of Medellín. I knew that this was not true; through my research, I had 
found that the Urabeños bloc has a strong presence in the city (Casa de las Estrategias). 
Juan Diego Restrepo confirmed this fact in our interview. The state's general 
unwillingness to speak of --or even admit to the existence of-- the phenomenon of "new" 
armed groups seemed indicative of its general effort to wipe the rooted history of 
paramilitary violence from the official record. I sensed that state representatives were 
worried of incriminating their institutions if they discussed the current phenomenon or 
spoke of paramilitarism with me. It appeared that Uribe's speech forbidding any sort of 
mention of paramilitarism applied beyond the police to all government agencies. 
Refusing to speak of paramilitaries or "new" armed groups seemed a strategy to erase any 
memory of state complicity in violence. However, this silent consensus had the opposite 
effect. The government's nearly unanimous efforts at refusing to speak of paramilitary 
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violence and in concealing and wiping from the official discourse any sort of mention of 
state involvement seemed indicative of the magnitude and immense scope of state 
complicity in paramilitarism. 
Informants were emphatic in highlighting the persistent ties between "new" armed 
groups and the state apparatus. Antonio Menéndez told me that "la convivencia sigue 
existiendo."Abilio Peña emphasized his organization's presence in local communities and 
assured me that he and his colleagues constantly witnessed police complicity with what 
he termed "paramilitary" activity. He recounted an anecdote of one of his friends, a land 
leader in Curvaradó, who had to leave the country because of constant threats against his 
personal safety. Peña discovered that it was a police officer that was coordinating his 
assassination, in conjunction with "paramilitary groups."  Cesar Molinares, Carlos Prieto, 
and Angélica Arias all noted the complicity between these "new" armed groups and the 
armed forces and police. A report by the Corporación Arcoiris indicates that throughout 
2011, numerous members of the armed forces and the police were arrested because of 
their links to "new" armed groups (Arias 19). Carlos Espitia also highlighted the fact that 
these groups coopt candidates in local politics, similar to the parapolítica phenomenon in 
the paramilitary era. The blue dots in Figure 1 represent the municipalities coded as "high 
risk" by the Ombudsman's office because of the presence of "new" armed groups during 
the 2010 elections. The map underscores the extent of penetration by "new" armed 
groups in local politics. Highlighting the possibly systematic nature of these practices is 
the fact that Colombian society utilizes the term bacrimpolítica to describe these links 
(Romper los Nexos 16). Concerns about the incursion of these groups into political 
processes are primarily in strategic zones of narcotrafficking and areas of economic 
importance to these groups (16). These examples make even clearer the current 
manifestations of a historical complicity between paramilitarism and the Colombian state. 
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Such collusion continues to be multifaceted, involving blatant complicity in illicit 
actions, tacit acceptance or inaction in the face of human rights violations, and the 
flagrant support for an economic project that foments violence. 
While informants all underscored the continuity of the paramilitary phenomenon, 
many described the current period as a different stage, one that resembles earlier 
expressions of paramilitarism. Interviewees' assertions countered the state's arguments 
that "new" armed groups do not share with Colombian paramilitaries' the clear 
hierarchies that characterized the AUC. Cesar Molinares reminded me that paramilitary 
groups, at one point, were not unified. The unification did not come until the Castaño 
brothers created the umbrella organization of the AUC in 1996. Before this period, 
paramilitary groups were localized, much like "new" armed groups today. In order to 
emphasize this point, Teófilo Vásquez explained that "el conflicto armado...lo que sufrió 
fue un retroceso." Maria Victoria Fallon told me that, while these "new" armed groups 
are more local, they are on their way to becoming structurally identical to the nationally 
unified AUC. Carlos Espitia explained that "algunos grupos se consolidaron y...cooptaron 
el resto de las organizaciones pequeñas." Antonio Menéndez echoed the ideas expressed 
by Vásquez, Fallon, and Espitia, explaining that the process of consolidation is similar to 
the one that the AUC followed. According to Angélica Arias, the government conceals 
this similarity by simply claiming that the number of "BACRIM" groups is diminishing.  
However, evidence points to their consolidation, rather than a legitimate dismantling of 
these groups. In a recent report, Indepaz presented information concerning the 
composition of these "new" armed groups. Police reports indicate that the number of 
discrete "BACRIM" groups went from 16 in 2008 to 7 in 2011. Nonetheless, as Indepaz 
points out, police reports also show a marked increase in the membership of these groups 
in this same time period (Jimenez 52).  
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The localization of these armed groups directly following the paramilitary 
demobilization was an effective technique for detracting attention from the human rights 
problems that these "new" armed groups generate, their similarity to paramilitary groups, 
and their rooted connections to the state. This strategy is similar to one that Colombian 
narcotraffickers employed to detract attention from their actions. According to political 
analyst Michael Kenney, the successors to the Medellín and Cali drug cartels "learned 
from their predecessors and deliberately downsized their operations to avoid law 
enforcement attention" (191). Paramilitaries and the complicit state utilized the tactic of 
localization to conceal from the international community their illicit actions and the 
continuity of the paramilitary phenomenon. This effectiveness of localization has 
historical precedence in the case of Colombian paramilitarism. In 1991, the National 
Strategy Against Violence (Estrategia Nacional Contra la Violencia) classified local 
paramilitary groups not as distinct actors, but as actors of organized crime (Grajales 163).  
This classification effectively concealed these groups' larger political and economic 
dimensions and downplayed the systematic human rights violations they committed. The 
state's 2005 demobilization was a successful strategy to draw attention away from the 
systematic violence and human rights issues that characterize paramilitarism. 
Carlos Espitia summarized informants' perspectives concerning the paramilitary 
phenomenon's continuity in the supposedly "post-demobilization" era, telling me that 
"hay mucho por que la paz no se haga en Colombia." Espitia underscored the vested 
economic and political interests at stake in the country, which foment violence for the 
sake of elite groups and at the expense of the grand majority of Colombians.  In short, the 
structural factors that fuel paramilitary violence continue to be relevant. The process of 
capital accumulation continues to be a significant component of the state's economic 
policy. Evidence to this assertion is the state's even more forceful embrace of the 
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neoliberal project in the "post-paramilitary" era; in October of 2011 the United States 
Congress ratified the US-Colombia free-trade agreement (FTA) with the full support of 
the Colombian government (Gómez-Maseri). Through its policies, the state continues to 
be complicit in the actions of "new" armed groups. These "new" groups continue to 
control strategic territories of significant economic importance, engaging in legal and 
illegal forms of enrichment that are supported by a neoliberal framework. Moreover, 
these groups replicate paramilitary human rights abuses and the state continues to support 
a generalized policy of impunity for these violations. In sum, the evidence demonstrates 
that the label of "bandas criminales" falls short in the characterization of these "new" 
armed groups. Through a thorough contextualization of the phenomenon of "new" groups 
and a comparison to the motivations and actions of paramilitaries, the continuity of 





Chapter 4: Institutionalized Amnesia in Colombia 
In December of 2011, members of the ERPAC (Ejercito Revolucionario Popular 
Antisubversivo de Colombia) agreed to demobilize. As the name itself indicates, the 
group maintained the counterinsurgent ideology that paramilitary groups claimed to 
uphold. However, breaking from its standard discourse concerning paramilitarism, the 
state did not recognize this group as one that upheld a specific political ideology. The 
ERPAC demobilization represented the first disbandment of one of the armed groups that 
the government classifies as 'BACRIM'. The important structural deficiencies evident in 
this demobilization mirrored the structural problems of the paramilitary peace process of 
2005. This "new" group's legal treatment as a phenomenon of common delinquency 
exemplified the government's refusal to admit to its insertion into a complex history of 
paramilitarism, one with important political and economic underpinnings. 
As a report from the International Crisis Group notes, the "ERPAC was always 
more than an ordinary criminal outfit," engaging in the same human rights violations as 
paramilitary groups and supported by the same "underlying criminal and corrupt 
structures" as these armed actors (Dismantling Colombia's New Illegal Armed Groups i). 
The ERPAC's composition shows continuity with its paramilitary predecessor, the Bloque 
Centauros of the AUC; the group is in the same strategic territory and maintains strong 
links with armed forces and the local government in the regions it controls (5).  Its 
specific repertoire of human rights violations also reflects that of paramilitaries, including 
targeted assassinations and forced displacement, described in Chapter 2 as two of the 
signature violations of paramilitaries (5). Corresponding to paramilitary groups, the 
ERPAC is involved in both licit and illicit economic activities, including narcotics 
trafficking. The consolidation of these groups also "coincided with a boom...in oil 
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exploration and African Palm cultivation" (7). In short, the ERPAC shares the complex 
characteristics of paramilitary groups that the key informants described. Its modus 
operandi exemplifies a simultaneously criminal and political nature and the group 
benefits from connections to the state. 
 The International Crisis Group's analysis echoes that of the interviewees, 
underscoring the important repercussions of the state's linguistic misrepresentation of 
these "new" groups. The legal treatment of the ERPAC in the demobilization did not 
transcend the common crime implications of the word "BACRIM," failing to recognize 
the hybrid political and economic structures that fuel this "new" armed group and the 
group's implication in the exacerbation of human rights violations. The state processed 
the ERPAC for charges of "aggravated conspiracy and...illegal possession of arms," 
despite evidence of its implication in violations of human rights (Dismantling Colombia's 
New Illegal Armed Groups 11).   As the Crisis Group stressed in its report, the common 
crime implications of the way the state classifies these "new" actors completely  "delink 
the groups from the internal armed conflict" (6). The inadequate legal treatment of these 
"new" groups, based on the category of organized crime that the BACRIM label implies, 
shows the important effects of labeling and discourse on "social responses and actions" 
(Evans 1050).  In this case, the government's imprecise label translated into legal action 
that did not reflect the true motivations and modus operandi of these armed actors. The 
Crisis Group concludes its report on the demobilization by underscoring the fact that 
"conflict dynamics" have not changed since the December 2011 demobilization because 
of the impunity in terms of the economic and political structures that sustain these armed 
actors (Dismantling Colombia's New Illegal Armed Groups 16). This impunity is a 
repetition of history, echoing the government's general lack of response to the human 
rights violations of paramilitaries and the overall impunity that characterized the Justice 
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and Peace process.  The government's disregard for these serious violations underscores 
its responsibility in the exacerbation of the conflict. Its deliberate decision to exclude 
these "new" armed groups from the context of the armed conflict shows an overall 
unwillingness to accept or make public the systematically similar motivations of the 
conflict throughout its long history and, most importantly, its own implication in the civil 
conflict's prolongation. It is the government's semantic and conceptual misconstructions 
that shape memory concerning the armed conflict in Colombia. Given the state's 
influence on perceptions of reality, society continues to understand the Violencia period 
as an ideological battle between liberals and conservatives. Paramilitarism from the early 
1980s to the 2005 demobilization is widely accepted as a similarly ideological conflict 
between the political left and right.  The government conceptualizes the current era by 
utilizing a label that implies a complete break with a misrepresented paramilitary past. 
The current conceptualization of "new" armed groups is based on an institutionalized 
amnesia concerning the true trajectory of the armed conflict.  
Towards the end of our interview, I asked the fiscal in Medellín to explain the 
reasons motivating the government's classification of these "new" armed groups as 
"BACRIM," despite the overwhelming contextual evidence pointing to the continuity of 
the paramilitary phenomenon. She explained that "al cambiarle el nombre al fenómeno, 
deja de existir." Abilio Peña echoed the fiscal, saying, "las palabras generan realidades y 
de tanto repetirlas todo el mundo termina creyendo que no hay paramilitares." In a similar 
manner, María Victoria Fallon underscored the importance of semantics to the 
government's institutionalized policy of forgetting. She told me that the government 
manipulates language "para justificar un proceso de desmovilización que no lo fue." The 
removal of the word "paramilitary" from the official discourse cements the state's 
misleading and oversimplified definition of the phenomenon, allowing for the obscuring 
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of the true motivations of paramilitarism. Additionally, the removal of the term from the 
state's discourse allows the government to disassociate itself from information that was 
slowly coming to light about its deep involvement with paramilitarism and its consequent 
role in fueling the armed conflict.  While the state's power in defining labels and societal 
perceptions limited the word "paramilitary" to a counterinsurgency project, the 
demobilization process allowed for the revelation of the true complexity of the 
paramilitary phenomenon and the government's institutionalized involvement. In 
response, the state utilized its hegemonic position in discourse construction to conceal its 
complicity. By semantically closing the paramilitary chapter through the introduction of 
the BACRIM concept, the government attempted to impede speculation into the true 
nature of the paramilitary phenomenon, in this way obscuring its own implication in a 
history characterized by human rights violations against its own citizens.  
Despite the state's attempt at silencing alternative discourses about the conflict, 
Colombian civil society refuses to passively accept the hegemonic story concerning the 
armed conflict. Informants utilized contextualization to challenge the state's influential 
discourse concerning paramilitarism's roots, causes, and culprits. In problematizing the 
state-formed conceptualizations of the armed conflict, informants revealed the true 
motivations and catalysts of paramilitarism and the important role of the state in 
promoting the conflict. Through their examination of the extensive trajectory of 
paramilitarism, interviewees inserted the phenomenon into a long-standing political and 
economic project of capital accumulation in defense of elite interests. From the pajaros in 
the Violencia period to the MAS and the unified AUC, and the "new" armed actors 
known officially as BACRIM, these groups are the defenders and executors of a violent 
model of capitalist accumulation for the benefit of a select political and economic elite. 
The state, through its actions, inaction, and complete silence concerning paramilitary 
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violence, is a key player in stimulating violence and, ultimately, in fueling the armed 
conflict. 
As I reflect on the intense debate I witnessed two years ago, I understand the high 
stakes involved in the process of naming in Colombia. Labeling these "new" armed 
groups BACRIM implies the complete success of the paramilitary demobilization 
process. In removing the word paramilitary from Colombian reality, the government 
attempts to prevent productive and important analysis into the roots of the paramilitary 
phenomenon. In insisting on naming these "new" groups 'paramilitaries,' civil society 
organizations aim to change the connotations of the word to reflect the historical reality, 
alerting to the state's immense complicity in the phenomenon and the powerful economic 
and political issues that sustain paramilitarism. Informants agreed that the 
misrepresentation of paramilitarism in Colombia has extremely high costs for human 
rights and the principle of non-repetition of violence. The government's deliberately 
inaccurate representation of the paramilitary phenomenon and lack of recognition of the 
structural connections between the previous phenomenon and the current one constitute a 
deliberate "amnesia," as María Victoria Uribe describes it (6). As she explains, "both a 
lack of symbolization and the suppression of traumatic events from the past have been 
decisive factors in the ability of paramilitary groups to reprise the heinous crimes 
committed by liberal and conservative bandoleros during La Violencia" (Uribe 6). The 
institutionalized process of forgetting, which the government facilitates through 
inaccurate naming and decontextualization, continuously fuels the armed conflict, 
allowing for the constant recurrence of violence. 
When I asked her opinion on the proper responses to these "new" groups, María 
Victoria Fallon explained, "cuando no se acepta un problema, la solución es imposible." 
The state's language shift from 'paramilitaries' to 'BACRIM' represents this deliberate 
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denial of the continuity of the structures that fuel the paramilitary phenomenon. Based on 
their understanding of the power of discourses in shaping societal responses, informants 
insisted on the need for linguistically and formally accepting the continuity of 
paramilitarism. At the same time, the informants' reliance on detailed contextualization of 
paramilitarism's history demonstrates the importance of questioning the labeling process 
and recognizing the power relations involved in discourse creation. As the key informants 
exemplified through their accounts, it is extremely important to move towards the 
creation of a narrative that more clearly shows the motivations behind Colombian 
paramilitarism. By contesting the state discourse and questioning the state's binary 
categories, which are incompatible with the extremely complex reality, key informants 
focused on the contextual evidence that points to the continuity of the paramilitary 
phenomenon. In disputing the state's classifications by means of nuanced 
contextualization, they actively engaged in a renegotiation of historical memory, in this 
way taking concrete steps to combat the amnesia that has defined the (mis)representation 
of paramilitarism in Colombia. 
When I asked Reinaldo Villalba to elaborate on his motivations in denouncing the 
continuity of paramilitarism in Colombia and challenging the state-formed 
conceptualization of the paramilitary phenomenon, he explained that his organization 
prioritizes the investigation and denunciation of crimes and violations for which the state 
is, by action or inaction, responsible: 
Nosotros tenemos una opción preferencial por las víctimas de crímenes de estado.  
¿Y por qué? Porque son las más vulnerables. Porque el estado maneja más sus 
recursos de impunidad frente a los crímenes cometidos por el propio estado. Ahí 
está la vulnerabilidad también. Más desprotegidas. Más excluidas. Incluso, 
negadas. Álvaro Uribe durante todo su mandato dijo que no habían víctimas de 
crímenes de estado.  Y por eso nosotros tenemos una opción preferencial por las 
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víctimas de estado. Eso es abiertamente dicho y nosotros tenemos ese derecho a 
escogerlo. 
Many other organizations echoed Villalba's comment, recognizing the state's 
immense power in influencing societal perceptions of reality and in concealing its own 
illegitimate actions. Their contestation of the state discourse through a thorough historical 
analysis of the trajectory of paramilitarism represents an important step in keeping the 
state accountable. Through their tireless work, these organizations bravely defy the state's 
powerful hegemonic position in constructing (and misconstruing) historical memory. 
Through their rejection of oversimplified classifications, these organizations attempt to 
make sense of violence in Colombia. Furthermore, they advocate for the right to truth, 
justice, and reparation necessary to the legitimate demobilization of paramilitarism. In 
exposing paramilitarism's true motives, they take the steps necessary for the non-
repetition of violence. By refusing to passively accept the hegemonic discourse created 
by a state with a proven interest in the prolongation of the armed conflict, these actors are 
part of a productive process of creating a narrative that pieces together a recollection that 
accurately represents the conflict. A more nuanced understanding of the conflict will 
allow for more appropriate actions for combatting the factors that generate violence in 
Colombia. In contributing to this process of societal acceptance of the true structures of 
violence, these actors become an essential part of Colombia's painful recovery from the 
state of amnesia that has afflicted the country throughout its civil conflict. 
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Appendix A:  Interview List 
1. Carlos Espitia, Instituto de Estudios de Desarrollo y Paz. Bogotá, Colombia. 
June 14, 2012. 
2. Antonio Menéndez, Impunity Section, UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights. Bogotá, Colombia. June 15, 2012. 
3. Angélica Arias, Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris. Bogotá, Colombia.  June 19, 
2012. 
4. Teófilo Vásquez, Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular. Bogotá, 
Colombia. June 20, 2012. 
5. Abilio Peña, Comisión Intereclesial de Justicia y Paz. Bogotá, Colombia. June 
21, 2012. 
6. Reinaldo Villalba, Colectivo de Abogados José Alvear Restrepo. Bogotá, 
Colombia. June 22, 2012. 
7. Carlos Prieto, Fundación Ideas para la Paz. Bogotá, Colombia. June 25, 2012. 
8. César Molinares, Verdad Abierta. Bogotá, Colombia. June 25, 2012. 
9. Federico Andreu, Comisión Colombiana de Juristas. Bogotá, Colombia. June 
26, 2012. 
10. Fabio Ruiz, Programa Presidencial para la Protección y Vigilancia de los 
Derechos Humanos y el Derecho Internacional Humanitario. Bogotá, 
Colombia. June 27, 2012. 
11. Luis Alberto Bonilla, Defensoría del Pueblo de la Nación. Bogotá, Colombia. 
June 27, 2012. 
12. María Victoria Fallon, Grupo Interdisciplinario por los Derechos Humanos. 
Medellín, Colombia. August 10, 2012. 
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13.  Juan Diego Restrepo, Verdad Abierta.  Medellín, Colombia. August 13, 2012. 
14. Anonymous Fiscal, Seccional Medellín- Fiscalía General de la Nación. 
Medellín, Colombia. August 21, 2012. 
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Appendix B: Interview Guide 
1. Please describe the work of the organization that your represent or describe  
 your profession (if no affiliation to the state or to an NGO). 
 Por favor describa la labor de la organización a la cual usted representa  
  o describa su profesión (si no tiene ninguna afiliación al estado o a una  
  ONG). 
2. Describe the principal developments in the armed conflict in Colombia in the 
 last 10 years. 
 Describa los principales desarrollos del conflicto armado en Colombia en 
  los últimos 10 años 
3. How has the armed conflict changed after the “Justice and Peace” process? 
 Después del proceso de Justicia y Paz, como se modificó el conflicto  
  armado?  
4. What is the position of the state regarding demobilized paramilitaries? 
 Cual es la posición del estado respecto a los desmovilizados? 
5. Has the military’s role in the conflict changed? 
 Ha cambiado la posición del ejército en el conflicto? 
6. Was paramilitarism effectively dismantled? 
 Se desarticuló efectivamente el paramilitarismo? 
7. Has there been news of demobilized paramilitaries returning to the conflict? 
 Han habido noticias de desmovilizados que se han reinsertado en el  
  conflicto? 
8. If yes, do they join other groups? Which groups? 
 Si si, se juntan a otros grupos? A que grupos? 
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9.  Have new armed groups emerged after the “Justice and Peace” process? 
 Han surgido nuevos grupos armados después del proceso de Justicia y  
  Paz? 
10.  If yes, What is the modus operandi of these groups? 
 Si si, cual es el modus operandi de estos grupos? 
11. (If yes to 9) Do they have a specific end or an ideology? 
 (Si si a la 9) Tienen algún fin específico o alguna ideología? 
12. (If yes to 9) What are the main issues that these groups generate? 
 (Si si a la 9) Cuales son los principales problemas que estos grupos  
  generan? 
13.  (If yes to 9) (If the participant represents a state agency or NGO) What is 
 your organization’s/institution’s position regarding these groups? 
 (Si si a la 9) (Si el informante representa a una agencia estatal o a una  
  ONG) Cual es la posición de su organización/institución respecto a estos  
  grupos? 
14. Can you describe the current human rights situation in the country? 
 Puede describir la situación actual de derechos humanos en el país? 
15. Are there differences between president Uribe and President Santos in terms 
 of human rights in the country? 
 Existen diferencias entre el presidente Uribe y el presidente Santos  
  respecto a los  derechos humanos en el país? 
16. Do you have any other comments on any of the topics we discussed? 
 Tiene algún otro comentario sobre cualquiera de los temas que hemos  
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